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The King and I: The Separation of Powers
in Early Hebraic Political Theory
David C. Flatto*
The extensive recent political and legal discourse concerning the constitutional themes of
separation of powers and judicial independence has sparked increasing interest in their respective
historical backgrounds. Certain early modern political writings point to significant theories of
governance emerging from the Hebraic tradition. By exploring neglected Hebraic texts from a modern
critical perspective, we can uncover bold and novel conceptions of authority.
Salient biblical passages that call for the separation of the king from the judiciary resist the broader
ancient and biblical tendency that invests all powers in the monarchy. Promoting the notion of an
independent judiciary, the earliest biblical strategy subordinates the king to other political leaders.
Later Judaic writings either extend this approach or attempt to reverse it.
Largely misunderstood early rabbinic writings further cultivate the concept of an independent
judiciary, but display a fundamentally different attitude toward the monarchy. Rather than demoting
the monarch, they establish the legitimate and independent political autonomy of the executive.
Further, they link the notion of an independent judiciary in surprising ways with the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. What emerges is a distinctive scheme wherein the king cannot judge, but in
many respects the court cannot govern either. Although these texts no longer carry authoritative
weight, they continue to have allure and significance for political and constitutional theory.
INTRODUCTION
In 1649 Claudius Salmasius, a prominent seventeenth-century humanist
and defender of the English Crown, wrote an influential broadside
charging the parliamentarians with regicide for executing Charles .'
Enlisted by Oliver Cromwell to respond on behalf of the parliamentarians,
John Milton wrote a scathing rebuttal. 2 By all accounts, Milton bested his
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1. CLAUDIUS SALMASIUS, DEFENSIO REGIA PRO CAROLO PRIMO 34-35 (1649).
2. JOHN MILTON, A Defence of the People of England, in 4 THE COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF
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opponent in their confrontation. Yet, Salmasius appears to have prevailed
on at least one point: mastering the meaning of a rabbinic text invoked in
the course of their argument.3
Why were Milton and Salmasius debating how to understand a rabbinic
statement? In a century that was to prove so formative for shaping
modern political thought, two leading political minds noticed something
that has long since been neglected: the richness of early Hebraic
reflections on governance. Drawing on classical sources in formulating
their enlightened political theories, these writers joined other prominent
early modern European thinkers in studying seminal traditions preserved
in Hebraic texts.4
This Article examines the early Hebraic roots of two central
constitutional themes, separation of powers and an independent judiciary.
Modern scholarship conventionally associates these concepts with the
Founding Fathers, who in turn were inspired by Enlightenment philosophy
and political theory.5 Studies with a broader historical perspective have
identified the origins of these theories in Greek writings from the Classical
and Hellenistic period and Roman works from the late Republic and the
early Principate.6 Despite the importance of the Greco-Roman political
tradition as a source of early democratic principles, its relevance for the
notion of an independent judiciary is rather limited.7  Early modem
European political discourse-such as that of Milton and Salmasius-
points to an entirely different classical heritage, the Hebraic tradition,
however, which does have deep roots connecting to these themes. This
Article will accordingly evaluate various early Jewish sources which
JOHN MILTON 350-58 (Don M. Wolfe ed., Yale University Press 1980.
3. See JASON ROSENBLATT, TORAH AND LAW IN PARADISE LOST 18-19, 90-98 (1994).
4. See ld.; JASON P. ROSENBLATT, RENAISSANCE ENGLAND'S CHIEF RABBI: JOHN SELDEN
(2006); JEFFREY S. SHOULSON, MILTON AND THE RABBIS: HEBRAISM, HELLENISM, AND
CHRISTIANITY (2001).
5. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1992); GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD (1997); ANNE M.
COHLER, MONTESQUIEU, COMPARATIVE POLITICS, AND THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (1988); DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2001); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS,
THEORY (2004); Douglas Adair, The Tenth Federalist Revisited, 8 WM. & MARY Q. 48 (1951); Scott
D. Gerber, The Political Theory of an Independent Judiciary, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 223
(2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/ gerber.html.
6. See, e.g., Gilbert Chinard, Polybius and the American Constitution, in THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT 217-37 (Frank Shuffelton ed., 1993); CARL J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE
CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME AND THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1995).
7. In particular, the kernel of the separation of powers doctrine derives from classical political
theory, especially the proposal of a mixed constitution advanced by Polybius and later Cicero.
Nevertheless, for Polybius and Cicero, the branches that they sought to separate are (to use modem
taxonomy) the executive and legislative. Under Polybius's model, judicial responsibility belonged to
the consuls and assemblies, and was not allocated separately to an independent body. Later after the
rise of the Principate (shortly after Cicero's life), the supreme legal power was of course the emperor.
See David C. Flatto, The Historical Origins of Judicial Independence and Their Modern Resonances,
117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 9 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/07/06/flatto.html.
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advance diverse models of separation of powers and an independent
judiciary.
While these texts no longer carry the authoritative weight they did in the
seventeenth century, they continue to have allure and significance for
political and constitutional theory. Beginning with the Bible and
proceeding to works from the Second Temple and Rabbinic periods,
various Jewish writings display novel, and at times bold, reflections on
political and legal authority.8 In contrast with most of the ancient world,
which vested supreme judicial authority in the king or emperor, certain
voices in early Hebraic thought--especially those of the biblical book of
Deuteronomy and the rabbinic Mishnah-assigned such powers to an
independent judiciary.
The salient biblical passages that call for the separation of the king from
the judiciary resist the broader biblical tendency that conforms with the
regnant ancient conception that invests all powers in the monarch.
Promoting the notion of an independent judiciary therefore presented a
formidable challenge for its proponents, and they responded with differing
strategies. The earliest approach recorded in Deuteronomy stripped the
king of judicial power by subordinating him to the religious leadership of
the priests and the judges. Subsequent (pre-rabbinic) Jewish writings from
the Second Temple period reacted to Deuteronomy in divergent ways,
some further demoting the king, and others restoring his stature and
judicial authority.
Early rabbinic writings emerge with their own singular response to the
deuteronomic tradition. Like Deuteronomy, the Mishnah cultivates the
concept of an independent judiciary, but advances a fundamentally
different approach to the monarchy. Rather than containing the monarch,
the early administrative system of the Mishnah establishes the legitimate
and independent political autonomy of the executive apart from judicial
responsibilities. Further, the Mishnah links the notion of an independent
judiciary with the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the broader issue of
monarchic responsibilities. In contrast with early notions of the immunity
doctrine which derive from the king's ultimate position at the head of the
legal system, rabbinic writings embrace sovereign immunity as a way of
more fully separating the king from the judiciary.
In contemporary legal and political discourse the themes of separation
of powers and an independent judiciary are among the most widely
discussed and debated.9 In many senses they are emblematic of the
8. Spinoza provocatively, if disparagingly, characterized the entire Torah as a political document.
See BENEDICT SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE (Jonathan Israel and Michael
Silverthorne eds., 2007).
9. See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS (Larry Alexander ed., 1998);
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1450 (1987); Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 268
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American legal tradition, and continue to inform the contours of modem
democracy. Nevertheless, each one has been the subject of fierce
challenges in recent years as they touch on basic definitional questions of
power and authority that are increasingly vital in a post 9/11 world.'0
Approaching these themes from a wider historical perspective exposes
their recurring systemic strengths and limitations, and also reveals the
nature of their complex interrelationship. Encountering past models and
approaches helps illuminate questions such as: how much independence is
desirable? When do checks and balances protect and when do they inhibit?
Does one of these doctrines rely on the cultivation of the other? And so
forth.
This Article's turn to the Hebraic tradition should also be seen as part of
a broader movement in contemporary political and legal scholarship.
Recent anthologies, translations, publications, conferences, books and
articles have refocused attention on the Hebraic political tradition." One
specific article contributed important insights into the nature of separation
of powers in the Bible. 12  With all their contributions, some of these
scholarly endeavors tend to simplify the material analyzed and to
insufficiently explore the material's subtle legal and political dimensions.
This Article aims to make a significant contribution to this growing field
by mining the biblical and rabbinic material in a nuanced manner, teasing
out the distinctive emphases in discrete Jewish writings while considering
(2000); William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 579 (2004).
10. On the topic of separation of powers, see MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER (2003); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000);
Patrick M. Garry, The Unannounced Revolution: How the Court Has Indirectly Effected a Shift in the
Separation of Powers, 57 ALA. L. REV. 689 (2006); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006) and Richard A. Epstein, Why
Parties and Powers Both Matter: A Separationist Response to Levinson and Pildes, 119 Harv. L. Rev.
F. 210 (2006), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/119/june06/epstein.pdf.
On the topic of judicial independence, see JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002); Aharon Barak, A
Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 150 (2002);
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J. 153 (2002). On the topic of the rule of law, see Symposium,
Terrorism, Globalization and the Rule of Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1979-2294 (2006). On the topic of
emergency constitutionalism, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Bruce Ackerman, The
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029 (2004); Bruce Ackerman, Response, This Is Not a War,
113 YALE L.J. 1871 (2004); David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's
Blind Spot, 113 YALE L. J. 1753 (2004); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick 0. Gudridge, The Anti-
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes,
Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Approach to Rights
During Wartime, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 161
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118
HARv. L. REV. 2673 (2005). See infra notes 172-77.
11. See especially THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION VOLUME I: AUTHORITY (Menachem
Lorberbaum, Noam J. Zohar & Yair Lorberbaum eds., 2003); THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION
VOLUME 2: MEMBERSHIP (Michael Walzer, Menachem Lorberbaum, Noam J. Zohar & Ari Ackerman
eds., 2006). See infra note 74.
12. Bernard M. Levinson, The First Constitution: Rethinking the Origins of Rule of Law and
Separation of Powers in Light of Deuteronomy, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1853 (2006).
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the important diachronic development of legal doctrines, especially during
the early rabbinic period.
A study of the Jewish polity has at least two advantages for modem
thinkers. The first is an advantage that scholars such as Robert Cover
found particularly appealing-Jewish writings reflect important insights
into law and politics from the vantage point of the disempowered. 3 The
second is that precisely because Jewish legal and political writings were
more theoretical than practical they had more freedom to imagine and
explore theories that may have been largely untenable to implement within
the realities of society in Late Antiquity.14 In this Article I explore certain
aspects of Jewish legal and political theory that emerged from the
intersection of both these factors, producing several basic doctrinal notions
that prefigure principles of contemporary constitutional theory.
In returning to these passages in the present context my aim is not
merely to recall forgotten sources that were influential in the early modem
period, but to analyze them in a modem critical study. Early modem
thinkers such as Milton, as well as many traditional commentators,
perpetuated a narrow reading of these passages that concealed their depth
and diversity. Specifically, they read these passages through the prism of
the Babylonian Talmud's exegesis of earlier rabbinic law that greatly
restricted the notion of separation of powers. Yet the early rabbinic law-
especially that which is recorded in the Mishnah-advances a distinctive
approach to questions of politics and governance that expands on aspects
of the biblical tradition in important and non-obvious ways. Even
Salmasius, who more closely grasped the original meaning of these
sources, employed them in polemical contexts that partially distorted their
meaning.15 In Part I of this Article, I summarize the version of rabbinic
law recorded in the Babylonian Talmud. I then demonstrate how this
reading has dominated later discussions of rabbinic law. Part I argues that
the Babylonian Talmudic tradition constitutes a dramatic revision of early
rabbinic law which has obscured a meaningful encounter with the early
Hebraic political tradition.
Instead of relying on the later revised Hebraic political tradition, this
Article will expose its original political and jurisprudential theory through
a diachronic and contextual analysis of selected early texts. In Part II, I
describe aspects of the earliest layer of the Hebraic tradition by briefly
13. See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179
(1985); The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1983); Suzanne Stone, The Pursuit of the Countertext: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1993).
14. As powerful as the Roman jurists during the Principate were, for example, they always
operated under the shadow of a dominant emperor who necessarily constricted their juristic
independence.
15. See also JOHN SELDEN, De Synedriis in 1 OPERA OMNIA 761 (David Wilkins ed., 1725) (who
has a more thorough analysis of the early Hebraic material).
2008]
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outlining the biblical approach to the relationship between the king and the
judiciary. In particular, I contrast much of the biblical literature relating to
this issue with the distinctive and influential model advanced by the book
of Deuteronomy.
Next, I demonstrate that the approach of early rabbinic law found in the
foundational legal text, the Mishnah, adapts the deuteronomic model in
significant ways. Part III presents close readings of various passages in
the Mishnah in order to expose a fundamental constitutional theme in
early rabbinic law. In this part, the Mishnaic approach to the relationship
between the king and the judiciary is fully reconstructed. Part III then
elaborates on the king's broader status in the rabbinic system. This is an
aspect of early rabbinic thought that has largely been misunderstood.
Given the king's central role in the Mishnah's political system, his
displacement from the judiciary is striking.
Part IV highlights the distinctiveness of the approach of the Mishnah by
contrasting it with three alternative models from Second Temple literature
that likewise expand on the deuteronomic text. Only after considering the
disparate expansions of the biblical foundation can the singular approach
of the Mishnah be fully appreciated. In the Conclusion, I return to the
mishnaic scheme to evaluate the theories of governance envisioned by the
early rabbis. I also explore some of the contemporary resonances of early
Hebraic political theory in modem constitutional jurisprudence.
I. LATER INTERPRETATIONS OF AN EARLY POLITICAL CONCEPT
Rabbinic law developed out of traditions that were transmitted orally
down until the second century CE. From that point forward many of these
traditions were collected by rabbinic authorities in Palestine and compiled
into several foundational works. The most famous collection of teachings
was redacted in the early third century and is called the Mishnah. It is a
kind of digest of early rabbinic law that presumably functioned as a legal
anthology or code for judges, teachers, and the larger traditional
population. Below we will recover aspects of the early Hebraic political
tradition by returning to the original teachings of the Mishnah addressing
the role of the monarchy and its relationship to other leading officials
according to Rabbinic law.' 
6
16. The Mishnah was redacted in the early third century in Palestine. The Babylonian Talmud,
which is an expanded commentary on the Mishnah, was redacted in the sixth and seventh centuries in
Babylonia. The Babylonian Talmud was often considered by later rabbinic authorities to be the
authoritative statement of all rabbinic traditions up until its time, notwithstanding its many bold and
innovative teachings. For the dates and characterizations of these and other rabbinic works cited
herein, see HERMAN L. STRACK & GUNTER STEMBERGER, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD AND
MIDRASH (Markus Bockmuehl trans., 1992); Suzanne Stone, The Pursuit of the Countertext: The Turn
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Before embarking on this study, however, it is worth pausing briefly to
explain why the early Hebraic political tradition of the Mishnah
concerning the distribution of power between the king and the judiciary
has been obscured. In large measure this is due to the fact that these
mishnaic teachings have, along with much of early rabbinic law, passed
through the filter of the later Babylonian Talmud. At the most basic level,
the Talmud, redacted in the sixth and seventh centuries in Babylonia,
presents a running commentary on the Mishnah. In reality, however, the
Talmud's relationship to the Mishnah is much more complex, as it is a
forum for later rabbinic traditions that amplify, expand, revise and amend
earlier rabbinic traditions of the Mishnah. In the present context, post-
talmudic theorists and commentators, from the eighth century until
contemporary times, have predominantly relied on the Babylonian
Talmud's distinctive exposition of the mishnaic teachings concerning the
allocation of power. The talmudic interpretation of this tradition,
however, fundamentally revises the Mishnah, turning its core teaching
about the separation of powers on its head. In order to demonstrate this
rather stunning reversal, we must return to the primary passage, and its
secondary elaborations.
A. Babylonian Hermeneutics
Directly addressing the relationship between the king and the judiciary,
the Mishnah declares "the king may not judge nor be judged."' 7 While
this statement sounds like a programmatic statement concerning
jurisdiction and judicial responsibility, the Babylonian Talmud
significantly qualifies its scope and impact. Citing the teaching of Rabbi
Joseph, the Babylonian Talmud elaborates:
This refers only to the kings of Israel; kings of the house of David,
however, both judge and are subject to judgment. For it is written,
"0 House of David, thus said the Lord: Render just verdicts, morning
by morning"I--and if they are not subject to judgment, how can
they judge others? For... Resh Lakish expounded [thus]: "Examine
yourself and only then examine others!"19
According to the Babylonian Talmud, the Mishnah's dictum records the
exception rather than the rule. For the primary principle maintains that
kings participate in, and are subject to the jurisdiction of, the judiciary.
The Mishnah merely presents a secondary rule that treats non-Davidic
kings differently. Here the Babylonian Talmud is invoking a distinction
that returns to the post-Solomonic monarchic schism in biblical Israel
17. Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2. For a more thorough evaluation, see infra Part III, Section B.
18. Jeremiah 21:12.
19. BABYLONIAN TALMUD Sanhedrin 19a-b.
Flatto
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between the northern kingdom (non-Davidic kings) and the Judean
kingdom (the Davidic dynasty). 21 In later biblical legacy, non-Davidic
rule is largely associated with political and spiritual corruption, and even
national catastrophe. 2' Accordingly, in various rabbinic traditions,
Davidic kings are portrayed as ideal rulers, while non-Davidic kings are
depicted as having an inferior status that is only reluctantly tolerated.2 In
the present context, the Talmud asserts that non-Davidic kings operate
with a different administrative scheme than Davidic kings, due to a
decisive historical episode:
But why this prohibition [of non-Davidic kings judging or being
judged]? Because of an incident which happened with a slave of
King Yannai who killed a man. Simeon b. Shetah said to the court of
sages: Be bold and let us judge him. They sent for the King saying
your slave killed a man. The King sent the slave to them. They sent
to the King saying you must appear with him. He appeared but sat
down before the court. Then Simeon b. Shetah said, Stand on your
feet, King Yannai, so witnesses may testify against thee. For you do
not stand before us but before He who spoke and the world was
created. The King replied, I will not act by your word but upon the
words of the court as a whole. He then turned to the left and to the
right, but all looked at the ground. Then Simeon b. Shetah said, Are
you wrapped in thought? Let the Master of thoughts come and call
you to account. Instantly, Gabriel came and smote them all and they
died. Then it was enacted: The king may not judge nor be judged,
testify nor be testified against.
23
According to the Babylonian Talmud, the Mishnah's rule constitutes an
emergency enactment legislated after an ugly showdown between a non-
Davidic, Hasmonean king and the court of sages led by Simeon b. Shetah.
This latter institution is likely an allusion to the Sanhedrin, the supreme
court of seventy-one judges that according to rabbinic tradition presided at
the Temple Mount in Jerusalem overseeing the judicial-administrative
system.24 To avoid future confrontations it was decided that insolent
kings, such as Yannai and all other non-Davidic kings, may not be judged,
and, therefore, should be distanced from the judiciary altogether.25
20. 1 Kings 11:29-39.
21. See JON DOUGLAS LEVENSON, SINAI AND ZION: AN ENTRY INTO THE JEWISH BIBLE (1987).
22. For a post-Talmudic formulation of this rabbinic tradition, see Nahmanides on Genesis 49:10
(Chaim Chavel ed., 1959) and Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:7-11 (Shabse Frankel ed., 1999). See
infra note 121.
23. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 19a-b.
24. On the historical and legendary references to the Sanhedrin or the court of sages, and for
additional information about their relationship to Hasmonean (non-Davidic) kings, see DAVID
GOODBLATT, THE MONARCHIC PRINCIPLE: STUDIES IN JEWISH SELF-GOVERNMENT IN ANTIQUITY 77-
130 (1994).
25. An additional gloss in the Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 19a-b explains that one who is not
subject to the jurisdiction of the court cannot enjoy the privileges of judging: "[A]nd if they are not
[20:61
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Nevertheless, Davidic kings, whose pious orientation and cooperative
nature are apparently more dependable, continue to follow the ideal
scheme wherein a king can judge or be judged.
B. Modern Theorists and Early Modern Commentators
Michael Walzer further unpacks the political scheme implicit in this
passage in the Babylonian Talmud. 6 He delineates the following two-
tiered model: (1) An ideal model for Davidic kings: here the king rules
alongside and as a part of the high court, the Sanhedrin. While the king
must act within institutional constraints and is subject to the jurisdiction of
the court (i.e., without the privilege of sovereign immunity), he
reciprocally gains the capacity to participate in the judicial apparatus.2 7
(2) An alternative model for non-Davidic kings: the only way the idyllic
model functions is if the king subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the
court and willingly participates with the judges. If, however, the king
refuses to cooperate, then the ideal structure collapses. Here, the
Babylonian Talmud portrays the failure of incorporating the kingship
within a constitutional structure.
Further elaborating on the implications of the withdrawal of the
(rabbinic) court from the political realm upon constitutional collapse,
Walzer suggests that one can discern in the alternative model the seeds of
a later pattern wherein religious actors reclaim political power only in the
absence of a strong, defiant political figure. Yet, notwithstanding
Walzer's emphasis on the alternative model, the ideal model remains the
ultimate political vision of the Babylonian Talmud. Thus, even as the
Talmud relays the episode which generated the enactment of the
alternative model, it reminds us that this is a reluctant solution.
In a penetrating article, Robert Cover underscored this point by
demonstrating how essential the narrative frame of the Babylonian
Talmud is in the above passage.28 For while the Mishnah records perhaps
the only pragmatically viable proposal (the alternative model), the
Babylonian Talmud makes clear that Simeon b. Shetah courageously
pushed for a different kind of solution (the ideal model). In Cover's words
"the gesture of courage is conjoined with pragmatic concession" in the
Babylonian Talmud, and "still the gesture of courage is the aspiration."
The Talmudic myth inspires us to transcend power, and specifically here,
emboldens judges to "speak truth to power" and not elect for "prudential
subject to judgment, how can they judge others? For... Resh Lakish expounded [thus]: "Examine
yourself and only then examine others!"
26. See THE JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION VOLUME i: AUTHORITY, supra note 11, at 139-41.
27. Although even the Babylonian Talmud, relying on an earlier teaching of the Tosefita, states
that the king may not join the high court of the Sanhedrin. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sanhedrin 18b.
28. See Cover, supra note 13.
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deference... , the great temptation, and the final sin of judging." In a
fuller sense, then, the Babylonian Talmud conveys the aspirational value
of the ideal model wherein the king judges and is judged.29
Together, Walzer and Cover successfully articulate aspects of the
Babylonian Talmudic tradition, but their respective analyses hardly shed
light on the core Mishnaic teaching.3 ° The upshot of the Mishnah is
actually the opposite: a king may not judge nor be judged. Similarly, the
Babylonian Talmud's rendition of the mishnaic law also dominated the
interpretation of theorists of the early modem period who mined early
Hebraic sources for their political traditions, beginning with the great
seventeenth century English thinker, John Selden.31 In his immensely
learned and voluminous study of Jewish courts, De Synedriis, Selden
relies on the original Babylonian passage which he cites, translates into
Latin, and then uses as the basis of his subsequent summary of rabbinic
law.3 Later Milton, influenced by Selden's Hebraism, also relied upon
the Babylonian Talmudic tradition. In his Defence of England, Milton,
who dismisses the fantastic intervention of the angel Gabriel at the end of
the passage, nevertheless follows the Babylonian Talmud in describing the
mishnaic law as a secondary one which reflects "a gradual usurpation on
the [king's] account against the opposition of the [Sanhedrin]." Therefore,
Milton (unlike Salmasius) concludes, in light of the Babylonian Talmud,
that the primary law is that the king judges and is judged.33 In fact, Milton
was so impressed with the implications of this ideal model that he returned
to it in a much more sweeping context in another work. In The Doctrine
and Discipline of Divorce, Milton provides a remarkably positive portrait
of Mosaic law, invoking this same Babylonian Talmudic inversion of
mishnaic law. It is the law, rather than "the Son," that incarnates deity:
... the law is his reveled [sic] will, his complete, his evident, and
certain will; herein he appears to us as it were in human shape, enters
into cov'nant with us, swears to keep it, binds himself like a just
lawgiver to his own prescriptions, gives himself to be understood by
men, judges and is judg'd, measures and is commensurate to right
29. Cover concludes that for the Babylonian Talmud ideally "there must be a jurisdiction of the
judges which the King cannot share," although a more accurate description of the Talmudic ideal is
that the king and the judiciary should be mutually involved.
30. The two scholars do not fully address the Babylonian Talmud's treatment because each
primarily focuses on whether the king can be judged, but does not sufficiently grapple with the issue
of whether the king can join the judiciary, and the interrelationship between the two questions. At the
same time, they each make helpful observations relating to the Mishnah's plain sense.
31. On the turn to Hebraism among early modem thinkers, see infra note 178.
32. SELDEN, DE SYNEDRIIS and OPERA OMNIA, supra note 15.
33. As additional support for Milton's conclusion, he cites I Samuel 8:6 (the initial request for a
king by the elders of Israel) where the king's judicial responsibility is depicted as one of his core
responsibilities. Unlike Milton, Salmasius recognized that the plain sense of the Mishnah differed
from the Babylonian Talmud's tradition. See infra note 38.
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One recent scholar summarizes this passage in Milton as follows: "The
most resonant phrases describe God as if he is a just king, who judges his
subjects and is judged in turn by them."35 In other words, for Milton, the
talmudic rereading of the Mishnah is not only politically coherent, it is
theologically foundational.
The dramatic reconfiguration of the Hebraic political tradition by the
Babylonian Talmud also informed all subsequent rabbinic commentaries.
Most significantly, Maimonides enshrined the Babylonian Talmudic
tradition:
Although the kings of the House of David may not be given seats on
the Sanhedrin, they judge others and are judged in a suit against
them. But the kings of Israel may neither judge nor be judged,
because they do not submit to the discipline of the Torah. [To sit in
judgment on them] might lead to untoward consequences. 
36
Maimonides's formulation understandably prioritizes the ideal model of
Davidic kings, and relegates the mishnaic alternative model to a secondary
position. For the legacy of the Babylonian Talmud is a vision of
integrated political responsibilities of the various branches of leadership.
Similarly, later interpreters of the Mishnah continued to read this text
through the lens of the Babylonian Talmud. Accordingly, medieval, early
modern and modern commentators, including critical scholars, interpreted
the Mishnah as presenting a secondary rule that applied only to non-
Davidic kings.
37
C. The Limitations of Babylonian Revisionism
Notwithstanding all of these secondary sources, however, the
Babylonian Talmud's commentary on the Mishnah, while certainly
interesting in its own right, must be recognized as a later revision that
subverted the model of separation of powers and sovereign immunity
implicit in the Mishnah. 38  For the interpretation of the Babylonian
Talmud is historically problematic and textually implausible. The
34. MILTON, supra note 2, at 2:292 (emphasis added).
35. ROSENBLATT, supra note 3, at 18-19, 90-98.
36. Hilkhot Sanhedrin 2:5.
37. See, for example, the summary of traditional commentators in PINHAS KEHATI, MISHNAH
MASEKHET SANHEDRIN 363 (1966). For modem critical commentaries, see HANOCH ALBECK,
SHISHAH SIDRE MISHNAH MASEKHET SANHEDRIN (Six Orders of the Mishnah Tractate Sanhedrin)
174 (1953); EPHRAIM E. URBACH, THE SAGES: THEIR CONCEPTS AND BELIEFS 441 (Israel Abrahams
trans., 1979); JACOB N. EPSTEIN, MEVO'OT LE-SIFRUT HA-TANNA'IM (Introduction to Tannaitic
Literature) 55, 417-19 (Magnes/ Dvir 1957).
38. Interestingly, as stated, Salmasius recognized this in Defensio Regia, supra note 1. However,
his emphasis on sovereign immunity no doubt ignored the latter half of the mishnaic teaching
regarding the king's lack ofjudicial authority.
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historical flaw emerges from a comparison of the Talmud's record of the
confrontation between Simeon b. Shetah and the king with other versions
of this episode in Josephus and elsewhere in rabbinic literature.39
Textually, there are several difficulties with the Babylonian Talmudic
tradition, beginning with the obvious strain involved in qualifying the
Mishnah's principle, and insisting that it is describing the exception rather
than the rule. Further, although the Mishnah primarily employs the
generic designation "king," it draws support for several of its rulings
specifically from the life of King David.4° Therefore, the Mishnah's
"king" at least also refers to members of the Davidic dynasty. Finally, the
Babylonian Talmud's reading undermines the stark and pervasive contrast
between the king and high priest that the Mishnah envisions, an essential
point that will be returned to in Part III below.
An alternative understanding of the pronouncement of the Mishnah is
found in a midrashic passage, which has strong echoes in the Palestinian
Talmud:
41
A law that our Sages relayed: The king may not judge nor be
judged .... Our Rabbis have taught us: Why may not a king be
judged? R. Jeremiah said: Because of King David it is written, "Let
my judgment come forth from Thy presence." Hence no human
being may judge the king, only God .... 42
Chronologically and geographically more proximate to the Mishnah
than the later Babylonian Talmud, the rabbinic interpreters of the Midrash
and Palestinian Talmud confirm that the plain meaning of the Mishnah is
the correct one. 43  According to this midrashic passage, the king is
granted sovereign immunity because he is subject only to God's
jurisdiction-a line that is quoted centuries later by the medieval English
jurist Henry of Bracton in his De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae.4
This explanation for the king's immunity does not necessarily reflect the
39. A full study of the various accounts requires separate treatment. See FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS,
ANTIQUITIES 14.158-84 (Ralph Marcus trans., 1933); SIFRE ZUTA, Devarim 19:17 (Menahem
Kahane ed., 2002); MIDRASH TANHUMA DEVARIM, Shoftim 30 (Buber ed., 1946). I thank Barry
Wimpfheimer for bringing these sources to my attention.
40. See Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2-4.
41. PALESTINIAN TALMUD Sanhedrin 2:3. Bernard Septimus brought this midrashic passage and
the first source in note 43 to my attention. He also pointed out the drastic change in tone in the
continuation of this midrashic passage. In terms of the Palestinian Talmud's position, another passage
in Palestinian Talmud Sanhedrin 2:3 (with a parallel in Palestinian Talmud Horayot) appears to
contradict it, and states that the king is judged by three judges (who can administer lashes to him as a
punishment).
42. Deuteronomy Rabbah 5:8 citing Psalms 17:2.
43. See the commentary of Rabbeinu Yonatan mi-Lunel on Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1-2. See also
Meiri, Horayot 266 (Abraham Sofer ed., 1964) who proves that the continuation of the Mishnah
records a Torah regulation-in prohibiting the king from testifying in court. This interpretation would
be more palatable if the opening statement of the Mishnah is interpreted as recording a Torah
regulation as well (and not a later rabbinic enactment).
44. HENRY OF BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (1230).
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king's superiority, but rather his distinctive role, which requires
independence from the reach of the judiciary. The corollary to the
king's sovereign immunity, therefore, is that he cannot judge.
We are left with the challenge of recovering an important early rabbinic
tradition recorded in the Mishnah concerning the separation of powers.
But the origins of the early rabbinic position actually derive in part from
the Bible. In order to properly delineate the early Hebraic tradition,
especially the distinctive approach of the Mishnah, we will return in Part
II of this Article to the origins of the relationship between the king and
the judiciary as presented in the Bible, including the noteworthy
passages in Deuteronomy. We will then move, in Part III, to the early
rabbinic writings of the Mishnah, which we will read on its own terms,
independently of the later Babylonian Talmudic commentary. The
Mishnah's approach expands on certain aspects of the model of
Deuteronomy, but also differs in other important ways. Part III will also
demonstrate the comprehensive and consistent approach of the Mishnah,
which distinguishes it from other rabbinic and non-rabbinic sources. We
will carefully reconstruct the Mishnah's position, and then attempt to
tease out its basis in political and constitutional theory.
II. Two BIBLICAL MODELS OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
In the world of the ancient Near East, the absolutist king was the
ultimate legal authority. Beyond adjudicating and enforcing legal rules,
ancient regimes empowered the king with full legislative powers. 45 A
vivid illustration of this orientation can be found in the Laws of
Hammurabi, which are presented as a collection of laws issued by the
pronouncements of Hammurabi, the eighteenth century B.C.E.
Babylonian king.46 Implicit in the royal prerogative to pronounce legal
rules is the king's ultimate power to resolve all legal disputes.
Hamurabbi further adds that he was blessed with divine gifts and with
the special ability of perceiving the principles of "justice and
righteousness" that inform his laws. Frequently, of course, the ancient
king would delegate judicial authority to subordinate judges and
magistrates. Yet, ultimately he had the power to overrule any legal
45. See MOSHE GREENBERG, Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law, in STUDIES IN THE BIBLE
AND JEWISH THOUGHT 25 (1995); A HISTORY OF ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN LAW (Raymond
Westbrook ed., 2003); KEITH W. WHITELAM, THE JUST KING: MONARCHICAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
IN ANCIENT ISRAEL (1979); Levinson, supra note 12.
46. HANS J. BOECKER, LAW AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE OLD TESTAMENT AND
ANCIENT EAST (Jeremy Moiser trans., 1980); THE BABYLONIAN LAWS (G.R. Driver & John Miles
eds., 1960); THE ASSYRIAN LAWS (G.R. Driver & John Miles eds., 1975); Martha T. Roth, LAW
COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR (2d ed., 1997); Martha T. Roth, Ancient Rights
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verdicts, and when he did not, his tacit approval was understood.
47
Moshe Greenberg, in a celebrated article contrasting aspects of
criminal law in the Bible and other ancient Near Eastern writings,
concludes that the Bible differs from these other works regarding these
very conceptions. 48 In the Bible, God is "the fountainhead of the law"
and the law is an embodiment of God's will. Accordingly, instead of the
royal law-giver, the Bible presents the law as deriving from divine
revelation at Sinai. Greenberg proceeds to demonstrate how certain
features of biblical criminal law reflect this fundamentally different
conception of the origin of the law, including the absence of ransom and
the highly constricted possibility of waiver and pardon. Nevertheless,
even Greenberg acknowledges that the responsibility for the adjudication
and enforcement of the Bible's divine legal principles resides in the
hands of human actors. Therefore, the precise role of the monarch in the
biblical scheme, while clearly different from that of other ancient Near
Eastern legal regimes, requires further examination.
A survey of the Bible generates a list of officials and personalities who
possess a certain measure of legal authority: local townsmen, elders,
priests, the high priest, (lay or professional) judges, and the king.49
However, the precise hierarchy among these legal actors is less clear.
Biblical scholars assume that during ancient Israel's primitive stages,
before a centralized state developed, legal matters were handled on a local
level.50 In the patriarchal and tribal world of biblical Israel, an elaborate
web of connections formed among individuals, families and tribes. Over
time (during the biblical period described in the book of Judges) these
connections developed into a hierarchical and organized legal and social
structure based on the model of a kinship group.51 At a later stage,
however, when Israel developed into a nation with a centralized
47. Greenberg, supra note 45, at 28:
However, the actual authorship of the laws, the embodying of the cosmic ideal in statutes of the
realm, is claimed by the king .... While the ideal is cosmic and impersonal, and the gods
manifest great concern for the establishment and enforcement ofjustice, the immediate sanction
of the laws is by the authority of the king. Their formulation is his, and his too.., is the final
decision as to their applicability.
48. See id; Moshe Greenberg, More Reflections on Biblical Criminal Law, in STUDIES IN BIBLE I-
18 (Sara Japhetl ed., 1986). See also PAMELA BARMASH, HOMICIDE IN THE BIBLICAL WORLD (2005)
(providing a summary of Greenberg's argument and related scholarship).
49. See ZE'EV W. FALK, HEBREW LAW IN BIBLICAL TIMES: AN INTRODUCTION 1-50 (2d ed.,
2001).
50. See Leslie Hoppe, Elders and Deuteronomy: A Proposal, 14 ECLISE ET THEOLOGIE 259
(1983); Jacob Milgrom, The Ideological Importance of the Office of Judge in Deuteronomy, in ISAC L.
SEELIGMANN VOLUME: ESSAYS IN THE BIBLE AND THE ANCIENT WORLD (Alexander Rofe & Yair
Zakovitch eds., 1983); Alexander Rof6, The Organization of the Judiciary in Deuteronomy, in THE
WORLD OF THE ARAMAEANS: BIBLICAL STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PAUL-EUGENE DION 92-112 (2001);
Moshe Weinfeld, Elders, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 578-80 (1972); Moshe Weinfeld, Judge and
Officer in Ancient Israel and in the Ancient Near East, 7 ISR. ORIENTAL STUDIES 65 (1977).
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administration, these legal structures were insufficient. The issue of
control of the judiciary, and the possible role of the king in this process,
became essential.
A. The Royal Judiciary
The most enduring description of the monarch's overall
responsibilities, including his surprising removal from the judiciary,
emerges from the political constitution recorded in Deuteronomy 17.
Yet, seen against the backdrop of the rest of the Bible, Deuteronomy
stands out as anomalous. In the larger biblical scheme, according to
most scholars, the king was central to the judicial system, and possibly
even the highest judicial authority in the land. Indeed, the initial request
by the elders for a king in place of a tribal ruler, as recorded in 1 Samuel
8:6, emphasizes the judicial responsibilities of this new kind of leader:
"Give us a king to govern/judge us." 52  Moreover, specific biblical
episodes suggest that the king was the final body to whom one could
appeal in legal disputes, whether as the supreme judge, or as one who
could exercise a special royal prerogative to annul or bypass any other
legal ruling. A vivid illustration of such powers appears in 2 Samuel 14.
Appealing directly to King David, a woman requests that the king
intervene in a clan dispute that has erupted after an accidental homicide
in her family. As the matter of accidental murder clearly constitutes an
issue that is governed by biblical law,53 this text displays the unique
monarchic privilege to resolve legal controversies. Another relevant
passage is 2 Samuel 15, where Absalom contests his father's monarchic
powers by attempting to allure the people to heed his judicial rulings, in
lieu of those of the king:
Absalom used to rise early and stand beside the road into the gate;
and when anyone brought a suit before the king for judgment,
Absalom would call out and say, 'From what city are you?' When
the person said, 'Your servant is of such and such a tribe in Israel',
Absalom would say, 'See, your claims are good and right; but there is
no one deputed by the king to hear you.' Absalom said moreover, 'If
only I were judge in the land! Then all who had a suit or cause might
come to me, and I would give them justice.' Whenever people came
near to do obeisance to him, he would put out his hand and take hold
of them, and kiss them. Thus Absalom did to every Israelite who
came to the king for judgment; so Absalom stole the hearts of the
people of Israel.
Evidently, he who controls the judicial process controls the monarchy.
52. See LYLE M. ESLINGER, KINGSHIP OF GOD IN CRISIS: A CLOSE READING OF 1 SAMUEL 1-12,
254-58, n.24 (1985).
53. See Numbers 35.
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King Solomon likewise plays a central role in adjudicating legal
disputes, and he is popularly remembered for his wisdom as an
adjudicator."4
Various other biblical passages can be adduced along similar lines,55
and given the reality of the surrounding cultures this fact is far from
remarkable. One particular source worth recalling in this context
describes the sometimes misunderstood judicial reforms of King
Jehoshaphat, as described in 2 Chronicles 19:5-1 1.56 According to the
Chronicler, Jehoshaphat appointed judges in all the municipal courts in
Judah. Further, he selected Levites, priests and family heads for the
Jerusalem court (the central court). At Jehoshaphat's instruction, the
Jerusalem judges were all placed under the supervision of his delegates:
the high priest, who was the religious delegate, and the governor of
Judah, who was the royal delegate. Finally, Jehoshaphat instructed the
newly appointed judges concerning the nature and aim of their judicial
responsibilities. According to the Chronicler's account, it is the king
who lays the cornerstones and constructs the edifice of the judiciary.
Even the two court supervisors (or, possibly, the leading justices) are his
appointees, and one of them apparently works directly under him as a
royal officer. All of this suggests that according to Chronicles the king
is the ultimate official who is responsible for the legal system, and
possibly the highest legal authority.
B. An Independent Judiciary
Scholars have long noticed the strong parallels between Jehoshaphat's
reforms and the arrangements envisioned in the political constitution of
Deuteronomy 17. Yet, even though the similarity in formulation is
unmistakable, in one fundamental regard these two sources have
divergent emphases. While 2 Chronicles 19 coheres with the widespread
biblical conception that locates ultimate judicial power in the monarchy,
Deuteronomy 17 advances a fundamentally different model built upon
the separation of executive and judicial powers. 17
According to Deuteronomy 17, at the helm of the elaborate network of
municipal courts required by Deuteronomy 16:18 are the central judicial
authorities who reside in the Temple Mount in Jerusalem: the judges,
54. See, e.g., 1 Kings 3:16-28.
55. See, e.g., 1 Kings 7:6, Psalms 72:2, Samuel 8:15, 12, 15:4, Jeremiah 26.
56. See W.F. Albright, The Judicial Reform of Jehoshaphat, in ALEXANDER MARX JUBILEE
VOLUME 61-82 (Saul Lieberman ed., 1950); Gary Knoppers, Jehoshaphat's Judiciary, 113 J.
BIBLICAL LITERATURE 59 (1994).
57. See Bernard Levinson, The Reconceptualization of Kingship in Deuteronomy and the
Deuteronomic History's Transformation of Torah, in 4 VETUS TESTAMENTUM 511-34 (2001);
Norbert Lohfink, Distribution of the Functions of Power: The Laws Concerning Public Offices in
Deuteronomy 16:18-18:22, in A SONG OF POWER AND THE POWER OF SONG: ESSAYS ON THE BOOK OF
DEUTERONOMY 336 (Duane L. Christensen ed., 1993).
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priests, and Levites, but not the king. As Bernard Levinson has
described it, there is a "double anomaly" in Deuteronomy 17's political
constitution.58 That is, the verses discussing the administration of
justice5 9 never suggest that the king participates in this role. In the next
sequence of verses,6" which directly address the role of the monarch, the
text likewise omits mention of any judicial responsibility on the part of the
king. A pair of verses from these respective sections employs a deliberate
rhetorical technique to accent this point further. A verse in the first
section describes the final jurisdiction of the supreme judicial officials by
stating, "do not stray from the word that they proclaim to you either to the
right or to the left.",6 1 In contrast, when mandating that the king write a
Torah scroll in the conclusion of the next section, the verse explains the
purpose: "in order that he not turn aside from the commandment either to
the right or to the left."62  In sum, the central judiciary supplies the
authoritative interpretation of the Torah's law. In contrast, the king is
relegated to a passive role of reading, not interpreting, the Torah, and he is
enjoined from straying from the Torah's law, as interpreted by the
judiciary. While the judicial officials have mastery over the Torah's law,
the king is subservient to the Torah, and, accordingly, to the judicial
authorities as well.
The distinctive approach of Deuteronomy 17 finds implicit support in
certain other biblical passages, although it is clearly less pronounced in
the Bible than the notion of a royal judiciary discussed in the previous
section. One passage that demonstrates the king's formal subservience
to the law of the Torah is evinced in the episode involving King Ahav
and the vineyard of Naboth.63 Reviewing this story from the angle of
jurisdiction, a rather remarkable point that emerges is that the greedy
king has no recourse for confiscating Naboth's property without
initiating (and then manipulating) a legal procedure. Not only does this
seem to undermine the right of eminent domain, 64 but it also belies the
notion that the king is the ultimate legal power.65 According to the
58. See id. See also the elaborate commentary by R.D.Z. Hoffmann in DEVARIM IM PERUSHO
SHEL HA-RAY DAVID ZVi HOFFMAN 287-342 (Zvi Har-Shefer trans., 1961).
59. Deuteronomy 17:8-13.
60. Id. at 17:14-20
61. Id. at 17:11.
62. Id. at 17:20.
63. 1 Kings 21.
64. The right is implied in I Samuel 8.
65. As Nahum Sarna has already noted, King Ahav has no power to simply impose his will by
force upon his subjects. Instead, he is limited by the restraint of the law (citing Deuteronomy 14-20,
and Ezekiel 45:8-9, Ezekeil 46:18). In contrast, Akkadian legal documents, and other documents from
Ugarit and elsewhere have shown the extreme and arbitrary royal powers that ancient kings often had.
See Nahum Sama, Naboth 's Vineyard Revisited (1 Kings 21), in TEHILLAH LE-MOSHE: BIBLICAL AND
JUDAIC STUDIES IN HONOR OF MOSHE GREENBERG 119-126 (Mordechai Cogan et al. eds., 1997); I.
Mendelsohn, Samuel's Denunciation of Kingship in the Light of the Akkadian Documents from Ugarit,
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Naboth story, the king is at least formally subservient to the rule of law.
To summarize the biblical material, then, what we find is that this
diverse and chronologically diffuse material can be largely divided into
two strands. One dominant strand depicts the king as the ultimate
authority in the legal system. Whether as the decisive arbiter of the law or
as the possessor of extra judicial powers that can override the law, the king
has the final word on legal matters. The second strand recognizes an
independent judicial authority that operates separately from the monarch.
More, the rhetoric of the verses depicts the judicial body as superior to the
monarch, as the king is subordinated to the rule of Torah, along with the
judicial authority's interpretation of Torah law.6 6 The second biblical
strand is amplified and adapted in critical ways in early rabbinic writings,
especially the Mishnah, as discussed in the next part of this paper. Part III
discusses the relationship between the king and the judiciary, and the
king's overall status in the Jewish polity, as presented in the Mishnah.
III. EARLY RABBINIC POLITICAL THEORY
Before exploring the political thought in early rabbinic writings, some
brief background about the nature of these texts is necessary:
A. Background to Mishnah and Tosefta Studies
As introduced above, the Mishnah is the leading statement of early
rabbinic law until the early third century CE. A roughly contemporaneous
collection of early rabbinic traditions that overlaps in significant ways
with the Mishnah is called the Tosefta. Literally meaning "supplements"
or "collections," this work has a complex and much disputed relationship
to the Mishnah.6 7 The wider scholarly consensus is that material in the
143 BULLETIN OF THE AMERICAN SCHOOLS OF ORIENTAL RESEARCH 17-22 (1956).
66. Both of the strands of the Bible differ from the larger conception of the monarch in the
ancient Near East, wherein the king is the giver of the law, the possessor of supreme judicial
wisdom, and often the exclusive judicial authority.
Numerous scholars have attempted to characterize the nature of the king's judicial authority according
to the Bible. See Levinson, supra note 12, at 1880-81, which highlights the approach of
Deuteronomy:
So consistent is the suppression of the monarch's judicial role that it points to the authors'
rejection of that norm .... Deuteronomy has reduced the king to mere titular head of state,
more restricted than potent, more otiose than exercising real military, judicial, executive and
cultic function. The sole potent authority is the Deuteronomic Torah .... In being thus
constituted by the Torah, the monarchy becomes regulated by and answerable to the law .... In
the classical Mesopotamian legal collections ... it was the monarch who promulgated law.
Deuteronomy reverses the precedent: here it is law that promulgates the monarch.
See also id. at 511; FALK, supra note 49, at 48-50; GREENBERG, supra note 45, at 28; WHITELAM,
supra note 45, at 207. Menachem Elon cites to instances of monarchic judicial power in 1 Kings 3:16
et seq., Jeremiah 21:12, 2 Kings 15:5, and 2 Chronicles 26:21 and to monarchic legislation in Joshua
24:25 and I Samuel 30:24-25. See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES
(Bernard Auerback & Melvin Sykes trans., 1994).
67. The exact semantic may be of consequence. See STRACK & STEMBERGER, supra note 16. See
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Tosefta relates to parallel material in the Mishnah in one of three ways: (1)
the Tosefta supplements the Mishnah's teaching; (2) the Tosefta preserves
an earlier, raw version of the Mishnah's teachings, or (3) the Tosefta
provides an independent record of early rabbinic teachings.
68
The Mishnah stands out in comparison with much writing from the
rabbinic period, including the Tosefta, in terms of its broader organization
and deliberate structure. Displaying, if unevenly, the imprints of an
editorial hand, the Mishnah is as a rule carefully constructed. It is no
wonder that when Maimonides, the great codifier of medieval rabbinic
jurisprudence, drafted his code of law he chose to imitate the style of the
Mishnah.69 As such, a thorough analysis of the Mishnah, including its
careful editorial frame, provides a unique opportunity to mine distinctive
rabbinic attitudes from the early rabbinic period.7" Recent advances in the
scholarly study of the Mishnah have gained much by recognizing the
importance of reading the Mishnah synoptically alongside parallel Tosefta
passages to better discern the distinctive themes and editorial strategies of
the Mishnah. The analysis below employs these methods in undertaking a
critical-legal analysis of the relationship between the king and the
judiciary, as presented in the Mishnah, in contrast with parallel teachings
in the Tosefta.
B. The King and the Judiciary in Early Rabbinic Law
The controversial status of the king in rabbinic law emerges from
various passages in early rabbinic writings aside from the Mishnah. In
contrast with their portrayal of the Sanhedrin (the high court) and high
priest as two of the cornerstones of the Jewish political edifice, these
writings equivocate about the stature of the monarchy. 7 Accordingly,
they accent the alien nature of kingship, dispute the scope of royal
prerogatives and emphasize the need to harness the king's powers.72
also infra notes 75 and 76.
68. See infra note 95. Other works were also compiled in this time period, including several
exegetical works that interpret the legal sections of the Torah and connect them with the oral
traditions. These works are referred to collectively as the Midrash Halakhah. See STRACK &
STEMBERGER, supra note 16; Jay Harris, Midrash Halachah, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
JUDAISM IV: THE LATE ROMAN-RABBINIC PERIOD (Steven Katz ed., 2006).
69. See ISADORE TWERSKY, INTRODUCTION TO THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES (MISHNEH TORAH)
(1980).
70. This is a project that Jacob Neusner advocated several decades ago in perhaps his most
important scholarly work JUDAISM: THE EVIDENCE OF THE MISHNAH (2003). See also Shaye J. D.
Cohen, Jacon Neusner, Mishnah and Counter-Rabbinics, 37 CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM 48-63 (1983)
(applauding Neusner's project but strongly criticizing his method).
71. This ambiguity probably reflects mixed signals generated by the Bible's normative passages
in Deuteronomy 17, historical passages in I Samuel 8-12, and the uneven monarchic record presented
in other portions of the Bible, especially Kings. Later medieval rabbinic commentators continued to
debate the desirability of monarchic rule. See especially Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:1-3
(Shabse Frankel ed., 1999) and Abravenel, Deuteronomy 17:14 (Mizrahi 1963).
72. See generally Tosela Sanhedrin 4, Sifre and Midrash Tannaim on Deuteronomy 17,
Flatto
19
Flatto: The King and I
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2008
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Further, in a stunning passage, the Tosefta even debates the very
desirability of the royal office.73 The king's rank is openly called into
question.
A survey of the Mishnah's selective treatment of this matter, however,
reveals a different orientation altogether. Specifically, evidence from the
Mishnah strongly suggests the following conclusions: (1) the king is
projected as a leading political figure, with broad executive powers,
granted singular license to function independently from legal institutions
in order to pursue his political agenda; (2) by repeatedly drawing parallels
between the king and high priest, the Mishnah intimates that they stand on
par in terms of their position as national leaders; (3) these parallels hint at
a dyarchy of prince and priest alongside the Sanhedrin, wherein each
officer has a divergent relationship with the Sanhedrin and, more
generally, the broader normative legal system; and (4) the above themes
are significantly more pronounced in the Mishnah than in the Tosefta, as
the latter contains mixed evidence about the standing of the king, and does
not deliberately compare him in a favorable manner with the high priest.
To highlight these points, the continuation of this Part will examine
the main passages in the Mishnah and Tosefta discussing the monarchy.
Part III, Section B, will especially emphasize points (1) and (3) above,
focusing on the king's relationship to the judiciary. Unlike the surviving
legacy of the mishnaic teachings, which was transformed by later
Babylonian Talmudic exegesis, the approach in this Part is to analyze the
Mishnah on its own terms. Part III, Section C, will elaborate further on
all the above points, expanding on the larger pro-monarchic orientation
of the Mishnah. Rather than exclusively focusing on the content of these
passages,74 this Part will also consider the Mishnah's rhetorical strategy,
which is especially clear when contrasted with the presentation in the
Palestinian Talmud Sanhedrin 2, Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 2.
73. See Sifre Shoftim 156, Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:5 (infra note 79).
74. The content of these passages has been treated extensively elsewhere, although some of their
nuances require elaboration. Further, previous analyses have not read the Mishnah and Tosefta
synoptically, nor paid sufficient attention to the distinctive contributions of the Mishnah. Some of the
more important discussions can be found in STUART A. COHEN, THE THREE CROWNS: STRUCTURES OF
COMMUNAL POLITICS IN EARLY RABBINIC JEWRY (1990); KINSHIP AND CONSENT: THE JEWISH
POLITICAL TRADITION AND ITS CONTEMPORARY USES (Daniel J. Elazar, ed., Transaction Publishers
1983); GOODBLATT, supra note 24; JACOB NEUSNER, RABBINIC POLITICAL THEORY: RELIGION AND
POLITICS IN THE MISHNAH (1991); MARTIN SICKER, THE JUDAIC STATE: A STUDY IN RABBINIC
POLITICAL THEORY (1988); JEWISH POLITICAL TRADITION, supra note 11; Gerald Blidstein, The
Monarchic Imperative in Rabbinic Perspective, 17 AJS REVIEW 15-39 (1983); Steven Fraade, Priests,
Kings and Patriarchs: Yerushalmi Sanhedrin and its Exegetical and Cultural Settings, in THE
TALMUD YERUSHALMI AND GRAECO-ROMAN CULTURE III 315-33 (P. Schafer ed., 2002); Steven
Fraade, The Torah of the King (Deuteronomy 17:14-20) in the Temple Scroll and Early Rabbinic Law,
in THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS AS BACKGROUND TO POSTBIBLICAL JUDAISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY:
PAPERS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT ST. ANDREWS IN 2001 25-60 (James R. Davila
ed., 2003). For a more elaborate analysis of the rabbinic texts discussed in Part Ill, see David C.
Flatto, It's Good to be King: The Monarch 's Role in the Mishna 's Political and Legal System, 2
HEBRAIC POL. STUD. 255 (2007).
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Tosefta. 7" An analysis of the formulations of the relevant mishnaic
passages proves particularly enlightening, as these are largely
uncontested, anonymous teachings that have been crafted by a strong
editorial hand, and reflect a remarkably consistent tone and style. 76
1. Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:1-2
77
The most elaborate treatment of the monarchy in the Mishnah is
75. In my treatment I have attempted to steer a middle course between two extremes that often
characterize synoptic studies of the Misnah and the Tosefta. At one pole, broad topical studies
surveying a wide range of material have been undertaken, attempting to discern the distinctive
viewpoint of each of these works. Thus, scholars have examined the Mishnah's and the Tosefta's
respective approaches to tradition, sexuality, gentiles, even to Judaism at large. For a classic example
of this kind of scholarship, see JACOB NEUSNER, JUDAISM: THE EVIDENCE OF THE MISHNAH (2003).
The danger of this approach is that, in its great ambition, it tends to generalize by assuming a highly
debatable uniformity to each of these texts and to overlook the precise structure and semantic of
individual passages. See Chaim Milikowsky, The 'Status Quaestionis' of Research in Rabbinic
Literature, 39 JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES 201-11 (1988); Peter Schafer, Research into Rabbinic
Literature: An Attempt to Define the Status Quaestionis, 37 JOURNAL OF JEWISH STUDIES 139-52
(1986). The opposite pole, skeptical about the ability to take a panoramic view, utilizes a zoom lens to
critically analyze specific passages. The best example of careful analyses of discrete passages is SAUL
LIEBERMAN, TOSEFTA AND TOSEFTA KIFSHUTAH (1992). The limitation of this methodology is that it
refrains from tackling the broader thematic questions that are the staple of the first approach. For
some related observations, see COHEN, supra note 70. The most successful studies merge these
methods: critically examining specific synoptic passages and at the same time culling information
relating to larger themes, thereby refining our knowledge of early rabbinic thought and advancing our
understanding of the interrelationship of these texts. This Article aims to employ this latter synthetic
approach to recover some of the rich political discourse relating to the status of the monarchy in the
Mishnah and the Tosefta.
76. Before beginning this inquiry, a methodological clarification is in order. Whether the
Mishnah can be evaluated as a whole in order to extract a distinctive attitude on a given normative
(halakhic) issue is certainly debatable. Given that the Mishnah is the most carefully redacted early
rabbinic text, the possibility of conducting such an inquiry into the Mishnah is more palatable than
with other tannaitic works. However, I have done my best to avoid relying on this generalization, and
have employed certain additional methodological safeguards in embarking on this study. First, this
part begins with close readings of specific passages in the Mishnah, and only then proceeds to make
broader generalizations about the Mishnah's orientation. Second, as the most consequential passages
regarding the monarchy have been carefully crafted, their rhetoric is very suggestive about the
orientation of the editor(s) of the Mishnah. Third, the various contrasts with the analogous material in
the Tosefta further reinforce these points. Similarly, the remarkable consistency of all such mishnaic
passages, in contrast with the equivocal treatment in other rabbinic texts, gives fuller weight to the
thesis developed below. Finally, I do not negate the possibility that certain similar themes can be
detected in passages recorded in other rabbinic texts, and at times I refer to such parallels myself. On
these methodological issues, see the works cited in the previous footnote, as well as SHAMMA
FRIEDMAN, TOSEFTA ATIKITA: MASEKHET PESAH RISHON (Hebrew) (Bar Ilan University 2002);
JUDITH HAUPTMAN, REREADING THE MISHNAH: A NEW APPROACH TO ANCIENT JEWISH TEXTS
(2005); ALBERDINA HOUTMAN, MISHNAH AND TOSEFTA: A SYNOTPIC COMPARISON OF THE
TRACTATES BERAKHOT AND SHEBIIT (1996); MARTIN JAFFEE, TORAH IN THE MOUTH: WRITING AND
ORAL TRADITION IN PALESTINIAN JUDAISM, 200 BCE-400 CE (2000); Avraham Walfish, SHITAT HA-
ARIKHAH HA-SIFRUTIT BA-MISHNAH 'AL-Pt MASEKHET ROSH HA-SHANAH (Literary Method of
Redaction in Mishnah Based on Tractate Rosh Ha-Shanah) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew
University 2001) (available on microfilm, Widener Library, Harvard University); INTRODUCING
TOSEFTA: TEXTUAL, INTRATEXTUAL, AND INTERTEXTUAL STUDIES (Harry Fox & Tirzah Meacham,
eds., 1999).
77. All citations below are based on the printed editions of the Mishnah and on Lieberman's and
Zuckermandel's editions of the Tosefta. I have reviewed most of the variations in the manuscripts and
have not found them to be of consequence to my overall thesis.
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recorded in the second chapter of tractate Sanhedrin.78 An initial
comparison of this section with analogous material in the Tosefta reveals
several glaring discrepancies. Unlike Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:5, which
openly debates whether there is a normative obligation to appoint a king
altogether, the Mishnah treats the position of the king as axiomatic.79
Similarly, whereas Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:5 disputes whether the king enjoys
the prerogatives described in 1 Samuel 8, Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4
dramatically affirms the broad powers of the king, including his right of
eminent domain: "[The king] may force a way [through private property]
and none may oppose him. There is no limitation to the king's way. The
plunder taken by the people [in war] must be given to him, and he receives
the first choice [when it is divided]." 80
The careful editorial strategy of Mishnah Sanhedrin 2 is evinced in its
opening lines, read independently of the later Babylonian Talmudic commentary:
The high priest may judge and be judged, testify and be testified
against, perform halizah, and have halizah performed to his wife ....
The king may neither judge nor be judged, testify nor be testified
against, perform halizah nor have halizah performed to his wife ....
Before discussing various aspects of the monarchy, chapter two
commences with a suggestive pair of symmetric passages that capture
the stark contrast between the high priest and the king by drawing
attention to the high priest's participation in the judicial process, in
contrast with the king. These opening paragraphs take on additional
significance in light of chapter two's placement within tractate
Sanhedrin. Whereas the majority of Mishnah Sanhedrin discusses the
judiciary-the leading institution in the rabbinic administration that is
afforded wide jurisdiction-this tractate also considers the other two
prominent officials: the high priest and the king.8" Given the primary
role assigned to the high court, the Sanhedrin, the Mishnah frames its
78. Ephraim Urbach and Jacob N. Epstein use questionable grounds to date this material early.
See URBACH, supra note 37, at 441; EPSTEIN, supra note 37, at 55, 417-19. Urbach and Epstein have
also been influenced by the Babylonian Talmud's reconstruction of the historical and rabbinic origins
of the Mishnah's pronouncement in Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2. For an analysis of Mishnah Sanhedrin 2
and the status of the king in Jewish works of Late Antiquity in general, see Fraade, The Torah of the
King, supra note 74, at 25-60.
79. Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:5:
Rabbi Judah says Israel was commanded to do three commandments upon entering the Land: to
appoint a king, to build a Temple and to destroy Amalek ... Rabai Nehorai says the entire unit
[commanding the appointment of a king] was only recorded because of the demands [of the
people of Israel] ....
(Author's translation).
80. See also Mishnah Baba Batra 6:7. Ephraim Urbach notes the sweeping language of the
Mishnah in this context. See supra note 37, at 441.
81. The broad jurisdiction of the Sanhedrin is already apparent in Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5, which
assigns the Sanhedrin a variety of responsibilities which include important extra-judicial tasks. See
also Tosefta Sanhedrin 3:4. Mishnah Sanhedrin 11:2 accents the unique role of the Sanhedrin in
disseminating Torah to the Jewish people.
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discussion of these other two leaders by considering their opposite
relationships with the judiciary. 
82
The Mishnah proceeds to amplify the distinction between these two
officials by stating that the high priest must comply with standard laws
such as levirate marriages and mourning rituals, which do not apply to
the king.83  In taking this step, the Mishnah suggests that the king's
independence from the judiciary is symptomatic of his broader
independence from the halakhah, the standard law. Conversely, the
Mishnah establishes the judiciary's independence from the king.
Importantly, even though the Mishnah presumably recognizes limitations
on the king's autonomy under the law, rhetorically it chooses to focus on
his exemptions from the legal system, in contrast with the high priest.8 4
As described in Part I above, later rabbinic writings debate how to
assess the singular autonomy granted to the king in this Mishnah. The
Babylonian Talmud clearly marks it as negative (seeing it as an alternative
model for non-Davidic kings), 5 while the Midrash and Palestinian
Talmud understand it in a positive manner. Aside from the various
difficulties with the Babylonian Talmud enumerated above, its reading
undermines the deliberate contrast between the king and high priest
inherent in the Mishnah.86 This contrast suggests that it is the king's
distinctive role which affords him a greater amount of independence.8 7 In
82. On this Mishnah, and later interpretations of this Mishnah by the Talmud, Maimonides and
other medieval commentators, see SAMUEL ATLAS, Netivim ba-Mishpat ha-Ivri (Pathways in Hebrew
Law)(1978).
83. Although the Mishnah continues to describe the idiosyncratic manner in which these laws
apply to the high priest, it emphasizes that these laws do apply to him on some level.
84. The opinion of Rabbi Judah b. Ilai recorded in the Mishnah partially disputes the primary
position and illustrates that the Mishnah here is not monologic. See Fraade, The Torah of the King,
supra note 74. Yet, overall the anonymous teachings of the Mishnah in this context significantly
advance a coherent and uniform approach.
85. Jacob N. Epstein sees Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4 as an echo of this position. While his
interpretation is somewhat dubious, undoubtedly this is a problematic source. Fraade, The Torah of
the King, supra note 74, at n.51, suggests that Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 19a-b would read
Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4 as referring to kings from the Davidic dynasty. Fraade himself proposes that
there may be a distinction between a king who joins the judiciary and a king who is presiding on his
own. In this vein, it is worth noting that Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4 seems to amend Tosefta Sanhedrin
4:7 slightly (I assume that the Mishnah here is later than the Tosefla. See infra note 95). The latter
states that the king brings his Torah Scroll with him to the "bet din" (a judiciary court), which the
parallel Mishnah emends to read as "yoshev be-din" (while judging, which perhaps should be
interpreted as, while sitting in royal judgment).
86. The medieval commentators add other interesting qualifications to the Mishnah's
pronouncement. See Tosafot and Hidushe Rabbeinu Yonah on Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 18b,
and Meiri Sanhedrin 65 (Abraham Sofer ed., 1964).
87. Fraade, The Torah of the King, supra note 74, at 4 1, states that the king is superior to the high
priest according to the plain sense of the Mishnah, as his honor is safeguarded. This is partially
corroborated by Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:1 's description of the high priest's legal status as akin to that of
an "ordinary person." If one were to transpose this logic to the Mishnah, what would emerge is that
the high priest is being treated as an "ordinary person" while the king is being treated as an
extraordinary person. However, I am impressed by the symmetry of the Mishnah's parataxis, which
implies equality in standing between the king and high priest. Also, the Mishnah seems to deliberately
discard the Tosefia's labeling of either leader as an "ordinary person." For the Mishnah, both officers
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contrast, the high priest not only does not need this degree of freedom;
but, on the contrary, his role as a spiritual leader demands his full
compliance with standard norms. Accordingly, his responsibilities are
closely linked with those of the Sanhedrin, accentuated by the very
rhetoric of the Mishnah.88 Indeed, the Midrash Halakhah, as specifically
quoted by a medieval commentator in his gloss on this Mishnah, confirms
this nexus by stating that ideally the Sanhedrin should be composed of
priests, "it is preferable that the court include priests and Levites among its
members." 89 In sum, the Mishnah strips the king of judicial authority,
which it instead assigns to the judiciary and high priest. At the same time,
the Mishnah affirms the king's leading executive role and buffers him
from judicial intervention. The approach of the Mishnah echoes
Deuteronomy 17's assignment of judicial responsibility to parties other
than the king (the citation of verses from Deuteronomy 17 in Mishnah
Sanhedrin 2:5-6 is therefore noteworthy), even as it emerges as more pro-
monarchic than this biblical foundation.
2. The Parallel Approach of Tosefta Sanhedrin
The importance of the opening paragraph in Mishnah Sanhedrin 2 can
be better appreciated by contrasting it with corresponding passages in the
Tosefta. As opposed to the Mishnah, the Tosefta does not develop the
same deliberate comparison and contrast between the king and the high
priest. Rather, in assessing the laws relating to these two officials, the
opposite impression emerges. Both the king and high priest are placed
within the constraints of the halakhah as "ordinary people," despite
several exemptions that apply to each: "if he (the king or high priest)
violates a positive or negative commandment or any other commandment
he is treated like an ordinary person in all respects."9 In fact, Tosefta
Sanhedrin even extends the regular legal status of the high priest to
homicide laws, notwithstanding his unique role and responsibilities in this
substantive area. 9 Moreover, the Tosefta likewise departs from the
Mishnah in apparently ruling that both the king and the high priest can
seem to be extraordinary, albeit in opposite ways.
88. This nexus is already apparent in Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5 and is enhanced by the common
responsibility of the judge and the high priest to serve as teachers (for the priests' duty, see the biblical
passage Malachi 2:7 and the rabbinic passage Mishnah Sanhedrin 11:2). Later, Maimonides continues
to amplify this theme. See, e.g., Hilkhot Sanhedrin 4:15 and Hilkhot Shemitah ve-Yovel 13:12-13.
89. Hidushe HaRan le-Sanhedrin 18a. The actual word used in this passage for this preference is
mitsvah. The contrasting relationship of the king and the high priest to the judiciary is especially
developed in the writings of the medieval rabbi, Rabbi Nissim. See Derashot HaRan II (who is not
the same figure as the author of the misattributed Hidushe ha-Ran le-Sanhedrin). For an analysis of
his position, see MENACHEM LORBERBAUM, POLITICS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW: SECULARIZING THE
POLITICAL IN MEDIEVAL JEWISH THOUGHT (2001).
90. Exceptions abound in all directions. See, e.g., TOSEFTA Sanhedrin 4:1-3, 5, 7-8.
91. See Numbers 35:28, Mishnah Makkot 2:6-7.
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participate in, and are subject to the jurisdiction of, the judiciary. To wit,
the Tosefta never states that the king cannot be summoned to court.
92
Further, the fact that an earlier Tosefta (Tosefta Sanhedrin 2:15) only
precludes the king from joining the Sanhedrin, the high court, implies that
he can function as a lower-level judge.93
By juxtaposing the largely parallel laws of the king and high priest, the
Tosefta essentially couples them in the same normative category. This is
further reinforced by the Tosefta's commanding respect for both the high
priest (in Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:1) and the king (in Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:2),
in contrast with the Mishnah which privileges such respect only for the
king. Finally, Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:10 seems to stipulate a novel rule that
a king's wife must be from a priestly family, although the precise meaning
of this passage remains uncertain. 94 Given the significant overlap between
much of the substantive material in these Mishnah and Tosefta passages,
and the fact that the Mishnah here presents a more carefully crafted
rendition of these laws, a plausible hypothesis is that in these passages the
Mishnah deliberately revised the earlier teachings of the Tosefta and
advanced a distinctive approach. 95
92. Given the significant overlap in subject matter discussed in the Mishnah and Tosefta in this
context, and considering the difference in their respective orientations, it is difficult to suggest that the
Tosefla here is merely adding glosses to the Mishnah. If anything, the Mishnah here appears to be
later than the Tosefta parallels (see infra note 95). For a discussion of similar methodological
considerations in comparing Mishnah and Tosefta passages, see the various references cited supra
note 76.
93. Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 18b seems to harmonize this pronouncement with the Mishnah
(see commentaries ad loc.). But this is not the simple sense of the Tosefta, which seems to bring the
monarchy and judiciary closer together. See also Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:10, which cites a prohibition on
appointing kings in the Diaspora, a law that the Babylonian Talmud associates with the Sanhedrin (see
Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 14a). It should be noted that Tosefta Sanhedrin 2:15 does recognize a
difference between the king and the high priest in each one's capacity to join the Sanhedrin. In
addition, Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:3 seems to describe royal punishments that are distinct from those meted
out by the judiciary, although the same source debates whether they differ in terms of their respective
legal consequences relating to inheritance. This last source raises an important issue not addressed in
this Article: the distinction between the king's leading and participating in the broader judiciary, as
opposed to the king's leading his own royal judiciary (similar to the parallel legal regimes that were
operative in medieval England. See JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY
(4th ed., 2002)). For the purposes of the analysis in this Article, either form of judicial activity by the
king would be sufficient to describe him as having a role with judicial responsibility.
94. See Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:2.
95. Recent scholarship has challenged the previous orthodoxy that the Tosefta always constitutes
a later gloss on the Mishnah, and has demonstrated that often the reverse is the case. Obviously any
sweeping presumption is problematic, and each discrete synoptic parallel has to be evaluated
separately. See supra Part Ill, Section A. For a very helpful summary of these issues, see the
introduction to TOSEFTA ATIKITA, supra note 76. Contrast this with the classical position of Abraham
Goldberg in THE LITERATURE OF THE SAGES: ORAL TORAH, HALAKHA, MISHNA, TOSEFTA, TALMUD,
EXTERNAL TRACTATES 283-302 (Schmuel Safrai ed., 1987).
It should be noted that although I have argued in various places throughout this Article that the
Mishnah appears to be a later redacted version of earlier raw teachings preserved in the Tosefta, this
argument is not crucial for my broader thesis. Rather, it is sufficient for establishing my thesis to note
that the Mishnah and the Tosefta's teachings differ in these various contexts, and that the Tosefta has a
more variegated view of the king's role and status. In contrast, the Mishnah appears to be more
consistently and uniformly pro-monarchic in its respective passages. This observation stands whether
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As chapter two continues, the Mishnah, in contrast with the Tosefta,
focuses exclusively on the monarchy and persists in portraying the king in
a positive light, highlighting the king's special prerogatives (Mishnah
Sanhedrin 2:4-5). Although these passages do specify unique restrictions
that circumscribe royal actions, such as limiting the number of the king's
wives and capping his accumulation of wealth, they present these
prohibitions within a positive context. The effect is to offset the deep
distrust of royal discretion that is implicit in these restrictions. 96  The
concluding Mishnah prohibits various disrespectful modes of conduct
toward the king out of a heightened measure of reverence for him.
Interestingly, this list is formed by concatenating two distinct sources from
the Tosefta mentioned above-one pertaining to the high priest (Tosefta
Sanhedrin 4:1), the other pertaining to the king (Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:2)-
and adding a new biblical source, "Thou shall surely set over thee a king
(Deuteronomy 17:15)," which is interpreted by the Mishnah as requiring
"that his [the king's] awe may be over thee." For the Mishnah, this
respect is mandated only for the king and likely bespeaks his singular
stature.
In sum, two main features distinguish the redacted chapter two of
Mishnah Sanhedrin from the presumably earlier Tosefta Sanhedrin
passages. First, the Mishnah eliminates negative and restrictive positions
recorded in the Tosefta that undermine royal authority. Second, the
Mishnah employs a parataxis absent from the Tosefta, wherein the king's
standing emerges as equal to the high priest, even as their roles are
opposite in nature. These two points might be connected to a certain
extent, as the Mishnah's positing broad royal power implies a high degree
of independence from standard normative law. 97
Importantly, the Mishnah depicts the king's independence as a positive
defining feature of royalty, and portrays the king as filling an
administrative position that is parallel in stature to the high priest, a crucial
point I will elaborate below. At the same time, the Mishnah enables the
formation and ascendancy of an independent judiciary. Indeed, in a
fundamental sense, the judiciary is a self-regulating institution.98
Moreover, according to the Mishnah, the Sanhedrin fills a singular
leadership position and bears responsibility for judicial, religious and
the Mishnah is earlier, later or independent of the Tosefta. Nevertheless, my impression regarding the
specific passages analyzed above is that indeed the Mishnah is a later redacted version.
96. Importantly, Mishnah Sanhedrin also substantively modifies these laws, as demonstrated by
Fraade, The Torah of the King, supra note 74, at 42-45. Further, it reconfigures the order in which
these laws are presented in the biblical text, further amplifying the theme of respecting the king. Id.
97. Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:5 may have an opposite nexus.
98. No other institution monitors or limits the Sanhedrin's authority. Further, the Sanhedrin
appears to bear responsibility for ensuring the overall proper administration of justice. For several
relevant mishnaic sources relating to this issue, see Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:6 and 11:2, Horayot 1:1-6,
Makkot 1:11, and Bekhorot 4:4.
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even certain national policy matters. Only after opening with an
elaborate discussion delineating several of the broad responsibilities of
the Sanhedrin (Mishnah Sanhedrin 1:5), does the Mishnah in the second
chapter turn to a description of the secondary offices of the king and
high priest. Further, the high priest, who is assigned a judicial role,
almost becomes merged into the more dominant institution of the court.
In the mishnaic scheme the judiciary stands apart and stands atop the
administrative hierarchy.
The overall administrative system of the Mishnah, accordingly,
consists of a leading institution with two subordinate offices. The
primary institution is the judiciary, led by the Sanhedrin, with the high
priest functioning along its side, and the king operating in a parallel
office that is afforded singular independence to pursue complementary
aims. Assessing the role of the king against this backdrop, however,
merely highlights the distinctive position of the king. The king's unique
independence from the Sanhedrin, notwithstanding the court's supreme
authority, surely emerges as noteworthy.
C. The Status of the King in Early Rabbinic Law
The political constitution of the Mishnah reflected in the above
passages promotes a separation of powers, establishing both judicial and
monarchic autonomy without ever introducing a strong notion of checks
and balances. Below we will survey two other synoptic passages related
to ritual responsibilities and fallibility involving the king and other
leading officials that further project the king as a leading official who
operates independently from the judiciary. A fuller portrait of the
constitutional vision of the Mishnah emerges from a close reading of
these sources.
1. Mishnah Sotah 7:7-8
Rabbinic tradition designates the king as the leader who reads the
Torah publicly at the post-Sabbatical ceremony known as Hakhel, in
contrast with Josephus who identifies the reader as the high priest.99
Beyond assigning the king this public ritual responsibility, the particular
presentation of this rite in Mishnah Sotah 7 further amplifies the king's
99. See FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY: JUDEAN ANTIQUITIES 4.209
(Steve Mason ed., Louis H. Feldman trans., 2000). The plain sense of Deuteronomy 31:9-13 supports
Josephus's reading. The Mishnah's identification may be partially based on the king's duty to
transcribe the Torah (which is never mentioned in Josephus, and may be the priests' duty according to
the Temple Scroll). See Fraade, The Torah of the King, supra note 74, at 45. Also, Josephus's
position may be based on the broader ambivalence reflected in his comments about the monarchy, in
contrast with the priesthood. See, e.g., FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY:
JUDEAN ANTIQUITIES 4:223; FLAvIUS JOSEPHUS, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY: AGAINST APION
1116:164-66 (Steve Mason ed., John Barclay trans., 2007). See also infra Part IV, Section A.
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vital religious role. In listing ritual recitations that must be performed in
Hebrew, Mishnah Sotah 7:1 counts Hakhel alongside the "blessing of the
high priest." Upon closer examination, the deliberateness of this
juxtaposition becomes eminently clear. In its substantive teaching and
literary construction, the Mishnah draws a strong parallel between the
ritual roles assigned to the king and high priest. 100
Mishnah Sotah 7:7 defines the "blessing of the high priest" as his public
Torah reading on Yom Kippur, along with his recitation of the
accompanying blessings. This Mishnah vividly depicts the ceremonial
procession at this occasion in which a line of officials transport the
Torah scroll to the high priest, who then reads from it while standing:
What is the procedure with the blessing of the high priest? The
synagogue attendant takes a Torah scroll and hands it to the
synagogue president. The synagogue president hands it to the deputy
and he hands it to the high priest. The high priest stands, receives
[the scroll], and reads from it while standing ... and he recites eight
blessings in connection therewith ....
The very next passage (Mishnah Sotah 7:8) portrays Hakhel,
intentionally invoking the same imagery:
What is the procedure with the portion read by the king... ? The
synagogue attendant takes a Torah scroll and hands it to the
synagogue president. The synagogue president hands it to the deputy
and he hands it to the high priest and he hands it to the king. The
king stands, receives [the scroll], and reads from it while sitting ....
The same blessings that the high priest pronounces, the king also
pronounces ....
Like the high priest, the king also conducts a public reading of the
Torah, along with the recitation of blessings, accompanied by the same
impressive procession that escorted the high priest. Further, the
concluding line confirms the deliberate comparison between these two
readings, "The king pronounces the same blessings as the high
priest ... ."10' In short, Mishnah Sotah 7:7 borrows the king's role of
reading the Torah and assigns a parallel duty to the high priest;
conversely, Mishnah Sotah 7:8 assigns to the king the priestly role of
reciting blessings. 102
100. Certain aspects of Mishnah Sotah 7 have been studied by David Henshke, Parshat Ha-
Melekh Keitsad? Le-Darkhe Arikhat Ha-Mishnah (How 'The King's Portion'? On the Methods of
Editing the Mishnah), 16 SIDRA 21 (2000).
101. The simple implication of the Mishnah is that the king even says the seventh blessing "[o]n
behalf of the priests."
102. The primary role of blessing the people belongs to the priests. See Numbers 6:22-27.
Consistently, Mishnah Sotah 7:7 labels this ritual as the "blessing of the high priest," rather than the
"reading of the high priest" (in contrast, the king's public Torah reading and blessings are labeled the
"portion read by the king"). Nevertheless, at times the king also blesses the people. See I Kings 8:14.
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Mishnah Sotah, then, requires two distinct, public ceremonies where
the Torah is read and blessings are recited, which has not been adequately
understood by modem scholarship. 0 3 For even as the rabbinic tradition
differs from other Second Temple traditions in assigning the post-
sabbatical Hakhel reading to the king, the Mishnah recognizes the high
priest's leading role in another public reading and benediction ceremony
held during the annual Yom Kippur Temple service. This dual
assignment to the king and high priest coheres with the other passages in
the Mishnah that are suggestive of a dyarchy where they both share
responsibilities.
By comparing the Hakhel ritual recitation of the king to the high
priest's reading on Yom Kippur, the Mishnah elevates the king's role.1
0 4
In fact, the Mishnah goes beyond this by depicting the king as occupying
the high priest's space-the Temple Mount-and especially by including
the high priest in the hierarchy of officials that transport the Torah scroll
to the king, implying that in some sense the high priest is subordinate to
the king. In a similar vein, while the high priest is enjoined to read while
standing the king is afforded the privilege of reading while sitting. '05
As opposed to the Mishnah, Tosefta Sotah 7 does not draw a parallel
between the sacred readings of the king and the high priest,0 6 and the
Tosefta certainly does not accent a parallel, dual distribution of
leadership responsibilities to the king and high priest. Similarly, the fact
that Tosefta Sotah 7:13-14 turns to the biblical figure Ezra, a priest, as a
paradigm for the king's Hakhel reading militates against the separation
of roles implicit in the Mishnah, as Ezra now emerges as a kind of
priestly monarch. Tosefta Sanhedrin likewise hails Ezra the Priest as a
model monarchic figure. 1
0 7
The most striking discrepancy between Mishnah Sotah and Tosefta
Sotah is their differing reactions to the historic Hakhel reading led by
Agrippa, a king of inferior lineage. 0 8 The Mishnah first records his
103. See JOSEPH TABORY, MOADE YISRAEL BI-TEKUFAT HA-MISHNAH VEHA-TALMUD (1995);
Fraade, The Torah of the King, supra note 74; David Goodblatt, Agrippa I and Palestinian Judaism in
the First Century, 2 JEWISH HISTORY 7-32 (1987); Daniel Silver, The Shrine and the Scroll, 31 J.
REFORM JUDAISM 31-42 (1984).
104. The particular comparison here is especially noteworthy, as the king's role at Hakhel is
equated with the high priest's responsibilities on Yom Kippur, the most holy day for the Jewish people.
105. A parallel ruling surfaces in Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:4 which states that kings of Davidic
descent have the exclusive right to sit in the Temple sanctuary.
106. In fact, it is unclear whether the Tosefta even assigns a distinct reading to the high priest
altogether. But see Tosefta Yoma 4:18. This of course depends on whether the Tosefta is a later gloss
to the Mishnah here, or an earlier or distinct tradition. See the methodological considerations raised
supra note 95. The fact that the Tosefta cites the model of Ezra does suggest that it is not operating
with the sharp dichotomy of the Mishnah, but this is not foolproof evidence.
107. See Tosefta Sanhedrin 4:7. Other sources alternatively depict Nehemia as a monarchic
figure, alongside Ezra the Priest. See GOODBLATT, supra note 24.
108. On the identity of Agrippa in the Mishnah, see DANIEL R. SCHWARTZ, AGRIPPA I: THE LAST
KING OF JUDEA (1990); Goodblatt, supra note 103; Dalya Trifon, Qeta Mimishnah Ke'edut
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supererogatory act of reading while standing, which generated the praise
of the sages: "King Agrippa stood and received it and read standing, for
which the sages praised him..." (Mishnah Sotah 7:8). The mutually
respectful interaction between the king-according respect for the
Torah-and the sages-recognizing his upstanding behavior-informs the
rest of the account in Sotah 7:8, as well: "When he reached, 'Thou may
not put a foreigner over thee,' his eyes ran with tears. They said to him,
'Fear not, Agrippa, thou art our brother, thou art our brother'."
The strong approbation for King Agrippa that is voiced in the Mishnah
sharply contrasts with the scathing critique of this episode cited in the
Tosefta. Tosefta Sotah 7:16 does not record King Agrippa's respectful
standing position, and harshly condemns the generation that meekly
reassured King Agrippa about his lineage, "Israel made themselves liable
to extermination, because they flattered Agrippa." The Tosefta
unabashedly implies that the rule of King Agrippa was illegitimate and
that the people of Israel accordingly had the obligation to denounce him.
These polar reactions to King Agrippa's Hakhel reading are consistent
with the Mishnah and Tosefta's different orientations toward the
monarchy. The Tosefta openly presents positive and negative aspects of
the monarchy. In Tosefta Sanhedrin it records opinions that undermine
this institution and in Tosefta Sotah it does not hesitate to criticize a
problematic regime. The Mishnah, on the other hand, consistently
maintains a positive slant toward the monarchy. Instead of vilifying King
Agrippa, the Mishnah depicts him heroically, and even adduces
corroboratory evidence from the King Agrippa episode that further accents
the king's positive leadership role in the Hakhel ceremony." 9 King
Agrippa is likewise presented in a positive religious leadership role in
Mishnah Bikkurim 3:4 where he is described or imagined as leading the
ceremony of the first fruit offering, and humbling himself by transporting
the fruit basket with his own hands. 0 In fact, this may be part of a larger
pattern of pro-monarchic historical revision in the Mishnah.
In sum, by employing a deliberate rhetorical construct, Mishnah Sotah
presents another instance of the dual distribution of leadership
responsibilities to the king and high priest. Tosefta Sotah, in contrast,
Lema 'amado Shel Hamelekh Agrippas Hasheni 53 CATHEDRA 27-48 (1989).
109. Other scholars have drawn other (somewhat speculative) inferences from the divergent
reactions to Agrippa's Hakhel reading recorded in Mishnah Sotah and Tosefta Sotah. See the
discussion in Trifon, supra note 108, at 35. While this Article's suggestion (that the differing
reactions are emblematic of larger differences between the Mishnah and Tosefta) is also only
conjecture, it has the advantage of resonating with the broader orientation of the Mishnah toward the
monarchy (in contrast with the Tosefta), and being consistent with the Mishnaic treatment of other
historical kings elsewhere. I hope to elaborate upon this latter important observation in a future
article, as it relates to the broader historiographic approach of the Mishnah. For now, see Flatto, supra
note 74, at 280-283.
110. See Tosefta Bikkurim 2:10 for a slightly fuller account.
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does not appear to utilize this parallel construct in this context. Further,
by conceiving of Ezra the Priest as a model monarchic figure, the Tosefta
does not envision a division of leadership roles altogether. Finally, the
distinctive orientation of the Mishnah can be detected in its discussion of
the Hakhel laws and the historical memory of Agrippa's reading, as well.
As opposed to the asymmetrical material recorded in the Tosefta, the
Mishnah presents a uniformly positive portrait.
2. Mishnah Horayot 2-3
Mishnah Horayot offers a highly schematic presentation of the laws
concerning the special sin offerings that are obligatory for the atonement
of various institutional leaders for certain errors or transgressions (based
on Leviticus 4 and Numbers 15). "' Mishnah Horayot 1 discusses the laws
concerning the special sin offerings brought by the Sanhedrin after
declaring an erroneous ruling. Chapter two, in turn, discusses the
regulations of the sacrifices brought by the high priest after he errs in a
ruling, which are in many ways comparable to those of the Sanhedrin.1"2
The latter half of chapter two introduces the king (called the Nasi, the
ruler) as the third official with special sacrificial guidelines (although his
obligation is apparently not triggered by a mistaken ruling but rather a
misdeed). In doing so, the Mishnah includes the king among the nation's
leading dignitaries, even as it treats him separately in certain respects." 3
While the overt purpose of these passages is to analyze subtleties in
sacrificial laws, the broader implication concerns the different foci of
power within the rabbinic framework. In addition, Mishnah Horayot
conveys that all three institutions of leadership are fallible and
responsible for repairing their own failures. This latter point includes
the monarch too, notwithstanding the principle of sovereign immunity
111. On this scheme, see MARTIN JAFFEE, THE TALMUD OF BABYLONIA: AN AMERICAN
TRANSLATION XXVI: TRACTATE HORAYOT (2000); AHARON SHEMESH, ONASHIM VE-HATAIM: MIN
HA-MIKRA LE-SIFRUT HAZAL, at introduction (2003); Avraham Walfish, Hatat Ha-Edah Ve-Akhrayut
Ha-Yahid-lyun Be-Darkhe Ha-Arikha shel Mishnat Horayot Perek Aleph (Individual and Communal
Sin-Tractate Horayot Chapter One), 6 NETUIM 9-36 (2000).
112. See Mishnah Horayot 2:1-4 (especially the suggestive language in 2:1).
113. The differences include the nature of the error (a ruling or an action), the nature of the
sacrifices required, and the rules that govern the obligation to bring the sacrifices. It should be noted
that the exact standing of the king according to the passages in chapter two is unclear. On the one
hand, the king seems to be at the bottom of the list of these three leadership offices. See Mishnah
Horayot 2:6-7. Nevertheless, his very inclusion among the list of leading dignitaries is noteworthy.
On the other hand, Mishnah Horayot 2:7 cites Rabbi Eliezer as stating that only the king brings a he-
goat (although this may be a function of his wealth). Moreover, Mishnah Horayot 2:5 subtly debates
the exact relationship of the king to the high priest and Sanhedrin, as Rabbi Yose Ha-Gelili equates
them, while Rabbi Akiva contrasts them. In general, even as much of Mishnah Horayot revolves
around the hierarchy of Jewish leadership, its specific rankings may be informed by the stature of the
respective leaders as legal adjudicators. Thus, Mishnah Horayot 3:6 ranks the high priest ahead of the
Sanhedrin, even though an opposite impression emerges from Mishnah Horayot 2:6-7. The
relationship between the opening and closing hierarchies in Mishnah Horayot deserves further study.
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that Mishnah Horayot 2:6 explicitly recognizes. 114
The king's standing is even more prominent in the final chapter of
Mishnah Horayot. In its opening passages, chapter three again presents a
deliberate comparison between the laws applicable to the high priest and
the king:
An anointed high priest who committed a sin ... and likewise a ruler
(=king) who committed a sin... an anointed high priest who vacated
his appointment, who then committed a sin, and likewise a ruler who
vacated his position, who then committed a sin . . . 115
These passages are particularly noteworthy since the Mishnah pursues
this comparison even as it assumes that the high priest actually bears
greater similarity to the Sanhedrin in the realm of these special sacrificial
laws."16 Moreover, unlike the passages in chapter two that essentially
elaborate on the biblical sacrificial scheme appearing in Leviticus 4, the
comparison presented in Mishnah Horayot 3 between the king and high
priest is an original creation of the Mishnah. Thus, Mishnah Horayot,
extending the motif developed in Mishnah Sanhedrin and Mishnah
Sotah, emphasizes the essentially parallel standing of the king and the
high priest.117
The climactic statement regarding the monarchy in Mishnah Horayot
appears later in chapter three. In an emphatic exegetical comment,
Mishnah Horayot 3:3 dispels any possible signs of monarchic inferiority
to the other leadership positions in one stroke. Justifying the common
rabbinic tradition of identifying the biblical Nasi (ruler) as the king, the
anonymous Mishnah states, "Who is meant by 'ruler'? A king, for it is
stated in Scriptures 'who has violated any of all the things which the Lord
his God hath commanded (Leviticus 4:22)'... a ruler above whom there is
none but the Lord his God." This mishnaic teaching constitutes one of the
more positive characterizations of the monarchy recorded in all of rabbinic
literature. 118
114. This is a crucial point that, as far as I can tell, has been largely ignored. Apparently,
Mishnah Horayot is envisioning that the king will come forth on his own and publicly (to the extent
that a royal sacrifice receives public attention) admit his error-and not simply leave matters between
him and God.
115. Mishnah Horayot 3:1-2.
116. See Mishnah Horayot 2.
117. The only difference mentioned in the opening passages of chapter three concerns the limited
duration of the monarch's status relative to that of the high priest. See Mishnah Horayot 3:2. This
may indicate that according to the Mishnah, monarchy is more functional and less formal than the high
priesthood. However, the status of the king while he functions, and his standing relative to the high
priest during his tenure, still must be considered-and this is the focus of this Article. On the question
of whether the standing of the king requires functional power, see also Palestinian Talmud Horayot
3:2 (considering the status of King David when he fled from Absalom). Tosefla Sanhedrin 4:11 may
implicitly relate to the difference between formal and functional power as well (in its discussion of
which leaders must be anointed with special oil).
118. The precise semantic of this statement is somewhat ambiguous. See Meiri Horayot at 276
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A comparison with the Tosefta again highlights distinctive aspects of
the editorial program of the Mishnah that are absent in what appears to
be the raw material of the Tosefta.19 First, the Tosefta does not record
the suggestive comparison of the king and high priest that appears in
chapter three of the Mishnah. 20  Second, while Tosefta Horayot 2:2
identifies the Nasi, the ruler, as Nasi of Israel (presumably a reference to
the king), it does not invoke the very positive scriptural basis that
appears in Mishnah Horayot 3:3 to explain this identification. In light of
the Tosefta's mixed presentation of material regarding the monarchy,
this omission is noteworthy. Moreover, in the next passage, Tosefta
Horayot, addressing an issue not found in Mishnah Horayot, states that
when a Nasi of Israel (=non-Davidic lineage) and a Nasi of Davidic
lineage share power, they both bring special sacrifices. 121 The Tosefta's
ruling undercuts the singular stature of the Nasi, and suggests that the
special sacrifice is more a function of the king's de facto political muscle
than of his distinguished title.1 22 In contrast, Mishnah Horayot, which
identifies the Nasi as the king who has no superior other than God, never
suggests that two people can simultaneously share this title. 123
The concluding passages of Tosefta Horayot explicitly address the
position of the monarch relative to other leaders (presumably in terms of
the sequence in which their respective sacrifices are offered). In an
ambivalent comment, the Tosefta states: "A sage takes precedence over
the king, since if a sage dies there is no replacement, but if the king dies
(Abraham Sofer ed., 1964). 1 assume that it is at least partly referring to the king's sovereign
immunity. See Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:2; Mishnah Horayot 2:6. This would substantiate a broad
reading of the legal immunities granted to the king by the Mishnah (as opposed to the Babylonian
Talmud), as argued above. Beyond this more specific connotation, the Mishnah's rhetoric conveys a
resounding general endorsement of the monarchy.
119. The same methodological issues raised above, supra note 95, apply here.
120. At the same time, the nexus between the Sanhedrin and the high priest that emerges in
chapter two of the Mishnah is less apparent in the Tosefta. See Tosefta Horayot 1:2, 1:8, 1:10, 2:4.
Regarding the king and testimony, Tosefta Horayot 1:10 deserves more careful analysis and
comparison with Mishnah Horayot 2:5 and 2:7 and Tosefta Sanhedrin 4 (as this passage in Tosefta
Horayot again confirms that a king can testify).
121. Regarding the distinction between Davidic and Israelite (i.e., non-Davidic) kings, see Tosefta
Sanhedrin 4:4 and II and Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 19a-b. It is interesting that the Tosefta
discusses these distinct kingdoms explicitly, while the Mishnah never does. Perhaps the Mishnah
wants to depict the ideal of a unified kingdom, similar to its ideal description of a national and tribal
court system in Mishnah Sanhedrin and Mishnah Horayot. For more sources relating to the difference
between Davidic and Israelite kings, see Tosafot Sanhedrin 20b; Meiri Horayot at 279 (and his
Introduction to Tehillim) (Abraham Sofer ed., 1964), and Maimonides, Hilkhot Melakhim 1:7-11
(Shabse Frankel ed., 1999).
122. Note, though, that Maimonides, Hilkhot Shegagot 15:9 (Shabse Frankel ed., 2003) combines
the ruling of Tosefta Horayot and the language of Mishnah Horayot. See LORBERBAUM, supra note
89.
123. The Tosefta's extension of the special sacrifice to the Patriarchate may be a further signal of
its orientation. See also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Horayot 1 lb. For more on the term Nasi, see Ezekiel
40-48; David Goodblatt, The Title Nasi and the Ideological Background of the Second Revolt, in THE
BAR-KOHVA REVOLT: A NEW APPROACH 118-20 (Aharon Oppenheimer & Uriel Rappaport eds.,
1984).
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all of Israel are worthy to be kings. The king takes precedence over the
high priest ...., Even as Tosefta Horayot surprisingly asserts the
king's priority over the high priest, it offsets this approbatory remark by
placing the king beneath the sage, and emphasizing that while sages have
singular significance, monarchs are replaceable. Not surprisingly, the
Mishnah never records this partially dismissive statement. 25 Indeed, the
impression conveyed by Mishnah Horayot 3:3, emphasizing the
uniqueness of the monarch, runs directly counter to this sentiment.
In sum, by developing the biblical verses into an elaborate sacrificial
scheme involving the Sanhedrin, high priest, and king, and by comparing
them with one another, Mishnah Horayot presents all three as positions
of leadership that require special sacrifices. In addition, by specifically
comparing and contrasting the king's offerings to those of the high priest
(especially in chapter three), the Mishnah again suggests that it
conceives of these two dignitaries as occupying parallel offices. At the
same time, Mishnah Horayot returns to the theme developed in Mishnah
Sanhedrin that emphasizes the disparate natures of these leadership
positions, as it couples the high priest and Sanhedrin (both depicted in
the role of adjudication), in contrast with the king. Finally, by
employing certain rhetorical devices, the Mishnah projects the singular
stature of the monarchy, despite its limitations, reflecting a pro-
monarchic orientation. The king has a central political role and operates
independently of the judiciary. The Tosefta omits this material and
instead includes rulings and statements that are of a more equivocal
nature.
3. Other Mishnaic Material
Various other passages scattered throughout the Mishnah confirm the
monarch's central place in the Jewish administration. Three such
passages will be surveyed below.
1) Mishnah Avot 4:13 famously records Rabbi Simeon's statement that
"there are three crowns: the crown of Torah, the crown of priesthood,
and the crown of royalty."' 26  This passage states plainly what was
124. Tosefta Horayot 2:8-9. See also Trifon, supra note 108.
125. My assumption is that Mishnah Horayot 3:8 was redacted later than the parallel Tosefta
passage. In fact, this Mishnah omits reference to the king altogether. If this omission is deliberate, the
Mishnah may be avoiding a specification that would partially detract from the king's stature.
126. The Sanhedrin, and rabbinic judges and sages in general, are often associated with the crown
of Torah. The early date of this statement (Rabbi Simeon is a rabbi from the third generation of
teachers in the Mishnah) makes this source relevant to a characterization of mishnaic material, even if
it appears in Mishnah Avot, which may be of a later date. Admittedly, the fact that it is a discrete,
individual teaching makes it less probative in describing the broader mishnaic orientation, than the
anonymous, rhetorically elaborate teachings discussed above.
The relevance of other pro-monarchic passages in Mishnah Avot (including 3:2 and several in the
chronologically later chapter six) has to be assessed on an individual basis. For more on the dating of
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implicit in the various passages surveyed above, identifying three
(presumably equal, presumably distinct) sources of authority among the
Jewish people.127 Despite the fact that it is the teaching of an individual
rabbi, and is recorded in a tractate that may have been redacted later than
the rest of the Mishnah, 28 this passage succinctly captures the mishnaic
spirit which is manifest in more subtle, but perhaps more consequential,
ways in the normative material discussed above. Interestingly, the
parallel source in Abot de-Rabbi Nathan adds an ambivalent gloss to this
statement, stating that ultimately the crowns differ from one another, as
priesthood and royalty are inaccessible, in contrast with the accessible
"crown of Torah." '129 This comment, along with the one from Tosefta
Horayot 2:8 cited above, portrays the monarchy as inferior to Torah
leadership since it is ironically either too closed (Abot de-Rabbi Nathan)
or too open (Tosefta Horayot).
2) Mishnah Yoma 7:5 contains one of several positive references to the
king in Mishnah Yoma, which is significant given that this tractate
primarily focuses on the high priest's role during the Yom Kippur
Temple service.' 30  Mishnah Yoma 7:5 is particularly noteworthy as it
establishes the king's prerogative to seek guidance by means of the
sacred priestly breastplate, the Urim v'Thummim, worn by the high
priest.'' The pro-monarchic orientation implicit in the Mishnah can be
highlighted by comparing it with the parallel teaching in the "Law of the
King" section of Qumran's Temple Scroll.' The latter presents the
sanction of the priestly Urim and Thummim as a necessary prerequisite
for royal action and thus as a check and limitation on monarchic
powers. 33 Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4, however, affirms broad royal powers
Mishnah Avot, see Myron B. Lerner, The Tractate Avot, in THE LITERATURE OF THE SAGES, FIRST
PART: ORAL TORA, HALAKHA, MISHNA, TOSEFTA, TALMUD, EXTERNAL TRACTATES 263 (Shmuel
Safrai ed., 1987).
127. The conclusion of the passage subordinates all three crowns to the "crown of the good
name," which may be part of a broader anti-establishment thrust present in tractate Avot. See, e.g.,
Mishnah Avot 3:5 and 4:15. This source departs slightly from the previous sources which imply that
the Sanhedrin (which is likely associated with the crown of Torah) is above the other two offices. For
more on this source, see COHEN, supra note 74.
128. See Lerner, supra note 126, at 263-8 1.
129. R.D.Z. Hoffman characterizes Abot de-Rabbi Nathan as Tosefla material. See STRACK &
STEMBERGER, supra note 16, at 226. In any event, it is certainly a parallel source to the Mishnah.
130. The very appearance of pro-monarchic material in a tractate that concentrates on the high
priest and depicts the high priest's leading religious role is itself suggestive.
131. Specifically, this passage grants the king the same access to the Urim and Thummim that it
affords to the high court of the Sanhedrin and to others upon whom the public depends.
132. For a more thorough discussion of the Temple Scroll, see infra Part IV, Section C. See also
Lawrence H. Schiffman, The King, his Guard, and the Royal Council in the Temple Scroll, 54
Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 237-59 (1987).
133. This is consistent with the overall orientation reflected in the Temple Scroll's "Law of the
King," which promotes a limited form of monarchy, as discussed infra Part IV, Section C. See also
YIGAL YADIN, THE TEMPLE SCROLL: THE HIDDEN LAW OF THE DEAD SEA SECT (1985); Fraade, The
Torah of the King, supra note 74; Schiffman, supra note 132.
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without predicating them on priestly approval. The Mishnah's political
constitution by in large operates with discrete distributions of powers,
which are not constricted by checks and balances. Consistently,
Mishnah Yoma 7:5 instead conceives of the royal usage of the Urim
v'Thummim not as a limiting mechanism which is imposed upon the
king, but rather as another royal prerogative to be used at the king's
discretion. 134  The Tosefta does not seem to contain this material
altogether.
3) Mishnah Yevamot 6:4 records the fact that the king appointed
Joshua b. Gamla as the high priest. The Tosafists, medieval
commentators, infer from here that the king generally is empowered to
appoint the high priest. 135 According to this reading, the king has the
authority to help form the leadership coalition. In contrast, Tosefta
Sanhedrin 3:4 seems to allocate the responsibility for appointing the
high priest to the Sanhedrin. 1
36
Overall, the Mishnah envisions a distinctive model of separation of
powers, which derives from Deuteronomy, but also revises the biblical
approach in important ways. I will return to the mishnaic scheme and its
particular elaboration on the tradition of Deuteronomy in the Conclusion.
Before concluding, I survey various alternative models of authority and
jurisdiction found in pre-rabbinic, Second Temple writings.
IV. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EARLY HEBRAIC POLITICAL
THEORY
Second Temple writings concerning the Jewish political administrative
framework provide an important window into how Jewish writers in the
post-biblical, pre-rabbinic period interpreted the biblical tradition and
utilized it along with various contemporary influences to construct a
model for a Jewish political system. This body of literature provides us
with a rare opportunity to assess the interpretive range of possibilities
that were available to the early rabbis, since these writings are roughly
contemporaneous and operate with the same biblical foundation. By
contrasting the rabbinic approach with other Judaic writings from a
similar period, one can better capture the distinctive constitutional and
political philosophy that animated the early rabbis in constructing their
mishnaic scheme. In this Part, I briefly consider how three prominent
134. For several relevant biblical passages relating to the Urim and Thummim, see Exodus 28:30,
Numbers 27:2, 1 Samuel 14, 28:6, Ezekiel 2:63 and Nehemiah 7:65.
135. Tosafot Yoma 12b.
136. But see Tosefta Yoma 1:4. In practice, during late Second Temple times, King Herod
assumed the authority to appoint the high priest, in contrast with the previous hereditary method
(which was interrupted at various points when competing priests usurped the position during the
Hasmonean period). See Isaiah Gafni, The Historical Background, in THE LITERATURE OF THE
SAGES, FIRST PART 19 (1984).
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writers from this period, in specific passages that relate to Deuteronomy
17, articulate the Jewish tradition's allocation of judicial responsibility,
and the role of the king, if any, in the judiciary. Specifically, I survey
passages from Josephus's Jewish Antiquities, Philo's Special Laws and
Qumran's Temple Scroll. I then summarize these various models and
contrast them with the political system advanced by the Mishnah.
A. Josephus on the King and the Judiciary
In the Jewish Antiquities, Josephus, the great Jewish historian of late
antiquity, provides a panoramic history of the Jews from biblical times
until their failed revolt against the Romans during the latter half of the
first century CE, an event he witnessed with his own eyes. In the early
sections of Jewish Antiquities, Josephus restates large sections of the
Bible, often interpolating subtle and innovative commentaries. 137 The
restatement of the laws of Deuteronomy 17 in Josephus's Jewish
Antiquities IV, sections 214 and 223-24, suggests that the judiciary
operates independently of the monarch. The ruler's responsibility in
establishing the court system is limited to setting up an autonomous
network of municipal courts (each with seven justices). Regarding the
actual administration of justice, the system requires that the municipal
courts refer hard cases to Jerusalem, where the high priest, prophet, and
council of elders (the Gerousia) serve as the leading judicial
authorities. 138 A parallel passage expanding upon Deuteronomy 17 in
Josephus's Against Apion, section 2:194, further highlights the central
role of the high priest in judicial affairs, stating that the high priest's
duty is to "safeguard the laws, adjudicate in cases of dispute, [and]
punish those convicted of crime."'' 39 In the enumeration of those who
have judicial responsibility, the king is conspicuously absent.
Elaborating on the verses regarding the king (Deuteronomy 17:14-20),
Josephus expresses a general ambivalence about the institution of the
monarchy. Thus, Josephus opens Jewish Antiquities IV, section 223,
with an emphatic statement endorsing aristocracy as the best polity.140
In Josephus's ideal framework, the rule of law will be supreme, and God
will be sovereign. Accordingly, a king is appointed only if the people
insist on a monarchy. In such a case, Josephus adds, justice must be the
king's concern, and he must be subservient to the laws. What Josephus
intends is not an aggrandizement of royal responsibilities, but rather a
137. See JAMES L. KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT WAS 586 (2001).
138. See the discussion in FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY: JUDEAN
ANTIQUITIES 1-4 n.668 (Steve Mason ed., Louis H. Feldman trans., 2000).
139. See id. at n.667. These sources are somewhat ambiguous as to whether the high priest
participates in an institutionalized judiciary, or as a-or perhaps the-independent judicial authority.
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restraint and limitation on the king's authority. In this vein, Josephus
continues, the monarch must solicit the counsel of the high priest and the
advice of the elders (the Gerousia) before he acts. This suggests a
dramatic form of subservience to these latter two institutions. 141 Here
too Josephus never states that the king participates in the judiciary
A fuller treatment of Josephus's depiction of monarchic powers, based
on his descriptions of more recent historical events, reveals a more
complex picture. This likely reflects the difference between Josephus's
ideal political vision and his realistic portrayal of political life in late
antiquity. 142  For instance, Josephus's restatement of Deuteronomy 17
seems inconsistent with his two retellings of the trial of Herod, then
governor of Galilee, who is summoned to court after executing some
brigands. 143  Josephus's accounts strongly suggest that the king is
protected by sovereign immunity (and Herod who aspires to be king is
attempting to enforce this privilege), and that the king (in this case the
actual king, Hyrcanus) also has a role in judging the perpetrator,
144
perhaps as a member of the Gerousia or the Sanhedrin. 145  In another
place, Josephus describes his own experience when he assumed
command in the Galilee in 66-67 C.E., a kind of executive position. He
selected a council of seventy men to serve as archons for the Galilee,
146
and he also presided with them.'
47
In sum, in his restatement of Deuteronomy 17 in Jewish Antiquities
and Against Apion, Josephus implies that the high priest, along with the
141. The need for approval from other leaders has parallels in the Temple Scroll, and, to a much
more limited extent, Mishnah Sanhedrin 2:4 (just in terms of waging war), as discussed supra Part
III.C. 3. Feldman labels this as a pro-priestly revision. FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, JUDEAN ANTIQUITIES 1-4,
at n.705. See also GOODBLATT, supra note 24, at 95 (who discusses the requirement of approval from
other leaders).
142. A complete account of Josephus's depiction of monarchic powers would require an analysis
of both his restatement of biblical narratives about kings (for example, his description of King
Jehoshaphat in Antiquities 9.4), and his account of Second Temple Hasmonean kings (for example, his
discussion in Antiquities 14 and Wars 4). The mix of idyllic principles and political realities would
undoubtedly produce an inconsistent picture of monarchic powers and responsibilities.
143. See FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, ANTIQUITIES 14:158-184 (Ralph Marcus trans., 1933). See also
FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, JEWISH WAR 1:204-215 (H. St. J. Thackeray trans., 1926) (a parallel account).
144. Samuel Belkin draws an opposite conclusion. See SAMUEL BELKIN, IN HIS IMAGE: THE
JEWISH PHILOSOPHY OF MAN AS EXPRESSED IN RABBINIC TRADITION (1960). See also the critique of
Louis Feldman in LOUIS FELDMAN, JOSEPHUS AND MODERN SCHOLARSHIP, 1937-1980 (1984). For a
complex formulation concerning whether the king judges independently or alongside a judicial body,
see GOODBLATT, supra note 24, at I11.
145. See GOODBLATT, supra note 24, at 94-119. See also JOSHUA EFRON, STUDIES ON THE
HASMONEAN PERIOD (1987); SETH SCHWARTZ, IMPERIALISM AND JEWISH SOCIETY: 200 B.C.E. TO
640 CE (2004); Seth Schwartz, 47 J. JEWISH STUD. (1996) (reviewing GOODBLATT, supra note
24)(discussing the role of the Gerousia and its relationship to other leadership officials).
146. See FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, WARS 2:569-571 (H. St. J. Thackeray trans., 1926); FLAVIUS
JOSEPHUS, LIFE FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY: LIFE 79 (Steve Mason ed.
and trans., 2000).
147. This action at least indicates that a quasi-executive could join something akin to a judicial
body. See GOODBLATT, supra note 24, at 114-115; FLAVIUS JOSEPHUS, JUDEAN ANTIQUITIES 1-4,
supra note 138, at n. 669.
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elders and perhaps the prophet, are in charge of judicial matters. 14' The
impression that one gathers from these sources is that these officials
operate independently from the king, assuming there even is a king; and
that if there is a king, he is subservient to these officials. This is
particularly manifest in Josephus's statement that the king requires
consent from other officials before acting. Other writings of Josephus,
especially his treatment of the Herod trial, convey a different impression,
likely reflecting political realities. They imply that the official king is
immune from the court's jurisdiction, and that the king has a role in the
exercise of judicial powers.
B. Philo on the King and the Judiciary
A leader of the large diaspora Jewish community of Alexandria in the
first half of the first century C.E., Philo was a prolific writer who
authored a multivolume series of commentaries on the Pentateuch.149 In
his Special Laws, Philo expounded upon the Decalogue and related
biblical passages, often interpreting them in an allegorical style that
betrays Hellenistic influence. In a rather elaborate section of his Special
Laws IV, on "The Appointment of Rulers,"' 50 Philo calls for the use of
elections, as ratified by God, for selecting the ruler.' I Following his
discussion of the monarch's appointment, Philo turns to the role of the
monarch in the national polity, delineating the particular requirements
and responsibilities of this office in sections 158-188. From the tone and
substance of these passages, it becomes clear that Philo considers the
monarch to be the highest national official. Thus, at the end of section
164, Philo states that the king possesses an "ensign of sovereignty which
none can impeach, formed in the image of its archetype, the kingship of
God." In a similar vein, the beginning of section 170 describes the king
as "the person who has been judged worthy to fill the highest and most
important office." In marked contrast with Josephus's explicit
reservations about the monarchy, Philo openly endorses the king as the
leading administrative official.
In detailing the responsibilities of the king, Philo enumerates judging
and the appointment of judges as important duties. Turning to the verses
from Deuteronomy 17, Philo restates the biblical instruction for the king
to write the "sequel of the law" with his own hand as a way of ensuring
that "the king's scepter will be this very law, ensuring equality and the
148. See BELKIN, supra note 144, at summary conclusion.
149. See Kugel, Supra note 137, at 597.
150. See Naomi G. Cohen, Contemporary Political Overtones of Philo 10 WORLD CONGRESS
OF JEWISH STUDIES 253.
151. PHILO, ON THE SPECIAL LAWS IV: 151-57 (F. H. Colson, 1929). Philo calls for elections
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proper balance between excess and deficiency.""15  Such a king will
"honor equality, be impervious to bribes and give just judgments"-all
classic indicia of a just judge.' 53 Responsible for the proper functioning
of the entire legal system, the king must delegate responsibilities to
lower-level officials who share his workload, including the dispensation
of justice. The king should limit his direct adjudication to "greater
matters," which Philo surprisingly defines as cases where there is a
disparity between the social standing of the two litigants. 15 4 In order to
illustrate this structural model, Philo cites the biblical model
implemented by Moses, the ideal ruler, who delegated judicial
responsibilities at Jethro's recommendation.' 55 According to Philo, the
king leads the nation, and his responsibilities include running the judicial
system, both directly and by assigning lesser matters to lower-level
judges.
In a subsequent section,' 56 Philo seems to inconsistently identify the
priests as the master judges. Expanding on Deuteronomy 17:8-13, Philo
interprets these verses as referring to a situation where a judge (not an
individual citizen) is uncertain about the law. In such a circumstance,
Philo explains, the local judge should defer to the expert judges who
have keener powers of discernment. In this context, Philo states that the
superior judges are the priests and especially the high priest, who gain
particular advantage because of their superb dedication to mastering
even the minutiae of the law, and their clarity of apprehension due to
their prophetic powers. Given the proximity of these sections in the
Special Laws, in all likelihood Philo is not contradicting his earlier
words, but rather envisioning a complex system of superior courts, Philo
seems to advance the following highly original dual scheme: (1) the king
is the ultimate judge for "greater" cases (where a disparity exists in the
social standing between the parties), and he uses his intimidating
presence and rarefied wisdom in adjudicating such matters without
prejudicing either party; and (2) the priests are the supreme judges for
"difficult" cases which demand complex legal analysis, and they call on
their profound expertise and even prophetic capacities in illuminating
such matters. "I In Philo's scheme, the king and the high priest may
152. See id. at 160 et seq.
153. See id. at 169. See also Exodus 18:21 and Deuteronomy 16:18-20.
154. PHILO, supra note 151, at §§ 170-72.
155. Id. at §§ 173-75.
156. Id. at §§ 188-192.
157. This fascinating scheme apparently stems from an exegetical point. Moses, the model of the
philosopher-king, is instructed to deal with "great matters" (as formulated in Exodus 18:22). The High
Priest, in contrast, is instructed to deal with "difficult matters" (as formulated in Deuteronomy 1:17).
For a twentieth-century version of the distinction between "great" and "difficult" matters requiring
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each assume the mantle of leading judicial authority, depending on the
nature of the matter.
C. The Dead Sea Scrolls on the King and the Judiciary
Among the most important of the Dead Sea Scroll texts that were
discovered in the mid-twentieth century is the Temple Scroll.
Apparently written by an ascetic sectarian group that lived in the Judean
desert around the second century B.C.E., this book restates sections of
the Pentateuch in a manner that reflects their sectarian ideology. 158 After
restating the verses from Deuteronomy 17:8-13 regarding the judiciary's
authority to resolve legal matters, the Temple Scroll proceeds to restate
the next sequence of verses in Deuteronomy 17:14-21 describing the
royal office. 15 9 Next, the scroll presents a section known as the "Law of
the King,"'160 which elaborates on the duties and prerogatives of the
monarch (based partially on an amalgam of verses from Exodus,
Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy). Scholars have demonstrated that
this section is a discrete literary unit which the redactor of the Temple
Scroll incorporated into the larger composition. 161 Among the prominent
responsibilities of the king enumerated in the Law of the King is the duty
to judge the people: "they (= the council) sit with him [the king] in order
to hear legal rulings and Torah teachings. . ." and "he [the king] should
not distort justice, nor take bribes in order to distort true justice."'
162
Thus, the Law of the King establishes that the king has judicial
responsibilities. However, the Law of the King constricts the king's
judicial autonomy in fundamental ways. To wit, it requires the king to
partner in his judicial role with a council composed of twelve princes,
twelve priests, and twelve Levites. Further, by interpreting the biblical
phrase, "that his heart should not become haughty over his brothers,"'
163
in a normative sense rather than a hortatory one, 164 the Law of the King
demands that the king defer in his judicial capacity to the decision of this
advisory council (in which he apparently participates).'65
The limitation of the king's judicial powers also emerges from other
158. See Kugel, supra note 137, at 576, 610.
159. YADIN,supra note 133, at 11Q19 LVI.
160. Id. at I 1Q19 LVII-LVIX.
161. See 1d.; Lawrence H. Schiffman, supra note 132, at 275-288; Andrew M. Wilson &
Lawrence Wills, Literary Sources in the Temple Scroll, 75 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 275 (1982).
162. YADIN, supra note 133, at LVII: 13-14, 19-20.
163. Deuteronomy 17:20.
164. See J. MAIER, THE TEMPLE SCROLL AN INTRODUCTION: TRANSLATION, AND COMMENTARY
126 (1985).
165. It may be that there is some legal evolution in the Temple Scroll's treatment of these matters.
See YOAV BARZILAY, OFIAH HA-MEKORI VE-ARIK14ATAH BA-MISHNIT SHEL TORAT HA-MELEKH
BE-MEGILAT HA-MIKADASH (THE LAW OF THE KING IN THE TEMPLE SCROLL: ITS ORIGINAL
CHARACTERISTICS AND LATER REDACTION) 72 TARBIZ 59-84 (2003).
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sources in the Temple Scroll. Both in an earlier section 66 and in a later
one 167 discussing the adjudication of specific substantive laws, the
leading judicial officials seem to be the priests, Levites, and judges,
while the king is not even mentioned. In fact, the entire Law of the
King, which is the king's charter, is written by the priests on behalf of
the king. The king is instructed to abide by the Law of the King, and
even transport it with him, 168 in fulfillment of Deuteronomy's charge to
the king to posses a scroll.169 The symbolism implicit in this act is that
the king derives his authority from this charter, meaning his
empowerment derives, in a certain respect, from the priests.
The cumulative impression from the Temple Scroll, including the Law
of the King, is that the judiciary is primarily composed of priests,
Levites and judges, and the king's judicial role is thereby contracted.
This structure parallels the Temple Scroll's requirement that the king
consult with the high priest's Urim and Thummim before waging war,
discussed in Part III.C, which demonstrates that the king's authority is
limited by the priests in other areas as well. The king, then, participates
in judicial affairs, but in a limited manner, and apparently not as a full
member of the judiciary.
Other post-biblical Jewish writings provide additional portrayals
of the role of the monarchy and its relationship to the judiciary.' 70 Yet,
this brief survey of several seminal pre-rabbinic texts provides an
important window into some of the more prominent attitudes of this
period. Further, the passages examined above are particularly instructive
in that they all begin with the same source-Deuteronomy 17, the rather
exceptional biblical text that envisions an independent judicial
authority-as the authoritative biblical point of departure. Nevertheless,
the three sets of texts differ fundamentally in their respective visions of
the ideal administration and the degree to which they aim for separation
of powers. According to certain references in Josephus, the judicial
authority is independent from the monarchy (assuming there even is a
monarch), and the monarch requires the approval of the judicial
authority for various state actions. In Philo's writings, by contrast, the
monarch (the leading political figure) stands in charge of the judiciary,
and is uniquely qualified to function as the superior judge for "greater"
cases. Finally, according to the Temple Scroll the king contributes to the
judicial order, but mostly works alongside, or even beneath, the priests,
166. YADIN, supra note 133, at LVI.
167. Id. at I 1Q19 LXI.
168. See id. at the end of LVI, and the beginning of LVII.
169. Deuteronomy 17:18-19.
170. See, e.g., New Testament writings (discussed in GOODBLATT, supra note 24, at 119 et seq.).
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Levites and judges.1 71  In contrast, the Mishnah, which also clearly
operates against the backdrop of Deuteronomy 17, projects an entirely
different scheme: the king has significant stature, but his role is separate
from, and independent of, the judiciary and the broader normative
system.
CONCLUSION
While separation of powers has been a cornerstone of American
constitutionalism ever since Madison, recent academic writings have
probed the scope and nature of this doctrine, and have even raised
trenchant challenges to its utility and role in modern governance. In
particular, legal scholars have discussed the viability of separation of
powers in the context of party competition; 172 the relationship of allocation
of power to the notion of checks and balances; 73 the alternative models of
institutional separation that have been adopted by other modern
democracies; 74 the balance of powers within the administrative state;
175
the role of an independent judiciary in relation to the other branches;
176
and the nature of separation of powers in an emergency constitution. 1
77
This Article aims to deepen our understanding of the constitutional
themes of separation of powers and judicial independence by exploring
their conceptual origins, and focusing on their understudied historical,
comparative and structural dimensions. Following the lead of early
modern European political writings, this study returns to the formative
theories of governance inherent in the early Hebraic tradition. An
examination of these neglected Hebraic texts from a modem critical
perspective exposes their subtle discourse relating to governance and
allocation of powers, especially the political theory implicit in the
Mishnah.
In comparison with most other administrative systems from Antiquity
and Late Antiquity, the Mishnah's model is unique. In the ancient Near
Eastern world the king was the lawgiver and its final arbiter. In the
171. Despite this summary conclusion, it is interesting to note that all of the Second Temple and
rabbinic sources analyzed in this Article contain counter voices-even the Mishnah. See supra note
84.
172. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 10.
173. See Epstein, supra note 10.
174. See Ackerman, New Separation, supra note 10; Bruce Ackerman, Meritocracy v. Democracy
(on the Reform of the House of Lords), 29 LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS 9 (March 8, 2007).
175. See Neal Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers; Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314 (2006); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 660-67 (1984).
176. See Burbank & Friedman, supra note 10; Friedman, supra note 10; Larry D. Kramer & John
Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 962 (2002).
177. See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY (2006); Tushnet, supra note 10.
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surrounding Roman world, the Emperor stood atop the legal system and
functioned as the ultimate legal authority. Even in the biblical world of
ancient Israel, the dominant viewpoint projected the king as the central
figure in the legal system. In marked contrast, the early Hebraic position
of the Mishnah entrusted legal authority to independent judges, and
displaced the king from the judiciary.
While the Mishnah follows the lead of Deuteronomy in envisioning an
independent judicial body, it also revises the biblical constitution in
important ways. Unlike the deuteronomic political blueprint which
imagines the king as occupying an inferior position to that of the judiciary,
the Mishnah calls for a strong and independent monarch. What is so
striking about the Mishnah is that it refuses to demote the king, unlike
Deuteronomy, the Temple Scroll and Josephus. Instead, the Mishnah
boldly proposes a king who is granted singular autonomy and who leads
without being constricted by the grand judicial body. The king has his
distinctive political calling, and must be allowed to pursue his mission
without unnecessary interference. The king cannot judge, but in many
respects the court cannot govern either. Early Hebraic thought presents a
model of separation of powers that enables a true division of
administrative responsibilities among the leading officials of the state.
An examination of these early Hebraic sources not only sheds light on
the conceptual origin of these constitutional themes, but also has relevance
for modem constitutional jurisprudence. Aspects of Hebraism likely
shaped the conceptions of the Founding Fathers, including their notions of
authority.'78 Given the recent call in contemporary legal scholarship,
especially since INS v. Chadha,179 for an original understanding of the
separation of powers doctrine, 180 there is particular value in reconstructing
the intellectual foundation that supported the framers of the Constitution.
More generally, the above study enriches our perspective on several issues
178. The question of Hebraic influence on American constitutionalism, including the American
doctrine of separation of powers and an independent judiciary, is an important subject of inquiry
requiring a separate study. See the important recent article by Eric Nelson, 'Talmudical
Commonwealthsmen' and the Rise of Republican Exclusivism, 50 HISTORICAL JOURNAL 809 (2007),
which provides a model for such a study (this article analyzes the Hebraic influence on early modem
republicanism). For background on the possible channels of influence of Hebraism on European and
American constitutionalism, see DOUGLASS G. ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF JEFFERSONIAN
DEMOCRACY 26 (2000); BAILYN, supra note 5, at 23, 34-35; HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND
REVOLUTION, 11: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 245-69 (2003); ROSENBLATI ", supra note 4, at 5-13; RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHTS
THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 82-100 (1979); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 16, 48, 98, 200 (1969); Richard Tuck, Grotius and Selden, IN
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1450-1700, at 499, 529 (J.H. Bums & Mark
Goldie eds. 1991).
179. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
180. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996);
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that have been at the forefront of modem constitutional scholarship.
Below I wish to briefly highlight several of the contemporary resonances
that derive from the texts examined above. 
81
1) Different Models and Goals of Separation of Powers
Bruce Ackerman's recent writings have emphasized that supporting the
separation of powers doctrine does not predetermine how power should be
divided.' 82 A variety of models of separation of powers exist in modem
democracies, and each one deserves independent evaluation in order to
measure which is most successful. Considered from the wider perspective
advanced in this study tracing back to early Hebraic sources, Ackerman's
observation is all the more forceful, as separation of powers has
undertaken a variety of forms from the period of its inception.
Yet viewing the plurality of models from this larger frame also
challenges a corollary argument that Ackerman advances. In order to
evaluate the various systems of separation of powers, Ackerman probes
further and inquires, "[S]eparating power on behalf of what?" In
response, he enumerates three objectives of separation of powers, all
relating to the broader aim of promoting democracy.' 83 This study,
however, reveals that the notion of separation of powers was developed in
an ancient world that was far from democratic. Distributing power in such
an environment was therefore oriented toward achieving political aims
other than democratic ones, such as effective administration, superior
enforcement and enhanced security.
Appreciating the fuller range of political goals that separation of powers
can help achieve has important implications for assessing the role of this
doctrine in contemporary times as well. Consider the highly contested
issue of separation of powers under an emergency constitution. In this
volatile atmosphere, achieving democracy may only be one of several
administrative objectives, and alternative goals may also be served by
redistributing power. To illustrate, the controversial unitary executive
theory is probably best understood not as a vehicle for democracy, but as a
way of achieving effective governance in dangerous times.' 84 Exposing
181. Other interesting issues that deserve consideration include the nature of sovereign immunity;
the way courts use history and historiography; the relationship between the separation of powers
doctrine and church and state issues; how disempowered or underrepresented groups can contribute to
the discourse of power and politics; and the formalist and functionalist approaches to separation of
powers.
182. See Ackerman, New Separation, supra note 10.
183. The first ideal is democracy; the second ideal is professional competence (in implementing
democratic laws); the third ideal is the protection and enhancement of fundamental rights. See id., at
640.
184. On the unitary executive theory see, for example, Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B.
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi
& Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L.
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the primary (and extra-democratic) justification for such a theory enables
one to better evaluate its desirability. It will also be consequential in
determining the parameters of the exercise of executive authority,
including the degree of transparency that is required.'85 Democratic
considerations may call for increased visibility, but security considerations
may demand greater confidentiality.
In a sense, this returns to Ackerman's primary argument: separation of
powers can assume a variety of forms. However, which form is most
desirable not only turns on the efficacy of each in achieving democratic
ends, but also in determining which other valuable ends they serve, and
the respective priorities among these alternative goals.
2) Binary Separation and the Distinction between Politics and Law
Scholarly studies of the constitutional separation of powers tend to
examine the tripartite division of governmental responsibilities.' 86 The
simultaneous focus on this threefold distribution derives from the three
articles of the United States Constitution, the threefold division defended
in the Federalist Papers, and the threefold scheme described by
Montesquieu.187  However, the Founding Fathers' citation of
Montesequieu as a source for the separation of powers doctrine relies on
his partial misinterpretation of English constitutionalism.' 88 While the
English system involved the King, Lords and Commons, these three
estates shared representation, but did not assume distinct administrative
functions. 89 To the extent that there was a distribution in functions within
the English model, it was between two branches. As Adam Tomkins has
demonstrated, the English model of separation of powers in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries essentially divided authority between
the king and parliament. 9 0 Similarly, the early Hebraic sources examined
REV. 1158 (1992); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthonly J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005).
185. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007); Katyal, supra note 173; Neal Katyal, Toward Internal Separation of
Powers, 116 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 106 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/2006/l0/26/katyal.html;
Neal Katyal, Counsel, Legal and Illegal, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 9, 2007, at 37-41.
186. This applies to scholarly articles, books, and treatises in the areas of constitutional law and
federal courts.
187. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, 11, 111; THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 297-304 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
196 1); SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Book XI, Section 6 (Franz Neumann ed., 1949).
188. See BAILYN, supra note 5, at 71-3, n. 16 and the sources cited therein.
189. Id.
190. Tomkins argues that the essential confrontation in the English model of separation of powers
is between the crown and parliament. The judiciary, however, is not part of the equation since the
confrontation secures accountability through political, not legal, means. This distinction has a certain
parallel with the Hebraic model of separation of powers, as discussed immediately below. See ADAM
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in this Article also essentially portray a twofold division of power. 9'
However, unlike the English system, theirs is a distribution of power
between the king and the court.
Retracing the origins of separation of powers, then, exposes two distinct
historical modes of separation: between (1) the king and parliament; and
(2) the king and the court. Moving forward to the tripartite division in
American constitutionalism does not entirely efface these initial twofold
distributions of power. Within the tripartite division of power, there are
distinct subdivisions and sub-tensions between each two respective
branches of government. Therefore, the dynamic of each respective
relationship needs to be separately assessed, alongside the simultaneous
interrelationship of all three branches.
This Article's examination of the early Hebraic sources specifically
focuses our attention on the relationship between the executive and the
judicial branches, and on the implication of promoting a division between
them. In reflecting upon the nature of this distribution of power, it is
worth returning briefly to the Mishnah's separation between the king and
the court which is especially suggestive.
The slogan of the Mishnah-a king cannot judge nor be judged-is a
reciprocal statement which not only divides these two institutions, but
gestures at a more sweeping separation between the spheres of politics and
law in general. The driving force behind this partition may derive from
the contextual background to the Mishnah's pronouncement. Compiled in
early third century C.E. Palestine, the rabbis of the Mishnah were living
under the Roman empire after the failed Jewish revolts of 66-70 and 132-
135 C.E.'92 Stripped of political authority, the rabbis primarily dedicated
their energies toward developing their own legal system. 19 3 Nevertheless,
in coming to terms with the realities of imperial success, they likely
gained a certain appreciation for the political achievements of the
Romans.' 94 Reflecting on power from their distinctive perspective, the
rabbis advocated separating between the realms of politics and law. Even
their vision of the ideal Jewish leadership scheme recorded in the
Mishnah, therefore, included a partition between the institutions of the
monarchy and the judiciary. 195
191. The Mishnah groups the high priest together with the Sanhedrin, the high court. See supra
Part Ill.
192. See SCHWARTZ: IMPERIALISM AND JEWISH SOCIETY, supra note 145.
193. See Gafni, supra note 136.
194. See GOODBLATT, supra note 24, chapter 5; Emanuel Friedheim, Politique et rabbinisme en
Palestine romaine: opposition, approbation et r~alitgs historiques, 59 THEOLOGISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT
97-112 (2003). The rabbinic appreciation of political power that is reflected in certain rabbinic
writings should be contrasted with the approach of early church fathers, especially before Constantine,
but also the approach of Augustine after Constantine. See DAVID A. LOPEZ, SEPARATIST
CHRISTIANITY: SPIRIT AND MATTER IN THE EARLY CHURCH FATHERS (2004).
195. The Mishnah does not provide an elaborate conception of the political realm beyond the
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The rabbinic aspiration to erect a barrier between law and politics
resonates with fundamental themes in American constitutionalism as well,
beginning with Marbury v. Madison. As Paul Kahn stresses:
Ironically, modem legal interpretations of Marbury locate its
brilliance in the assertion of political strategy that accomplishes its
end of empowering the Court while avoiding any command to the
executive .... On this view, governance by the courts must be
defended on political grounds, just like any other assertion of
political authority. The significance of Marbury, however, lies in the
other direction, that is in the distinction of law from political
action. 196
Kahn locates the magnitude of the Marbury decision precisely in the
partition that it erects between law and politics. He then continues to
elaborate on the fundamentally different nature of these two areas-law as
the realm of reason, and politics as the realm of action-and on the
implications of their separation for American constitutionalism. 97 A
fuller reflection on the history of this division is beyond the scope of this
Article, but the essential continuity of this aspiration as manifest in various
periods since late antiquity should be underscored. Further, it should be
emphasized that although Marbury sought to preserve the independent
nature of each one of these realms, this is precisely what Jefferson
opposed. Similarly, the Mishnah promotes a parallel partition, and the
later Babylonian Talmud which reverses the Mishnah tries to resist this
division as well. As Kahn further points out, the conflict over Marbury is
never fully resolved, and this insight runs even deeper when we realize
notion that it should be separated from the legal sphere. Accordingly, the primary rabbinic
contribution appears to be in claiming the centrality of this division. Indeed, the Mishnah's approach
to separation of powers is to make a very general statement about the distinct responsibilities of each
institution (the king and the judiciary). In this sense its approach to separation of powers is rather
simple, even thin. This corresponds to aspects of the American Constitution that did not adopt a very
elaborate system of separation of powers, but rather enumerated responsibilities of each branch.
Certain recent proposals relating to separation of powers try to develop much more intricate models of
this doctrine with more elaborate forms of checks and balances. For instance, Neal Katyal's recent
calls for separation of powers within the executive branch would require a whole new complex scheme
of inner-executive checks and balances. See supra notes 173, 185. My study at least raises the
question about whether an elaborate form of separation of powers is wise, or even viable.
Another possibly way to think about this issue may be from the vantage point of the Youngstown
dispute between Justices Black and Jackson about whether to adopt a formalistic or functional
approach to separation of powers, which continues to be a central question in constitutional
jurisprudence. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); RICHARD H.
FALLON, THE DYNAMIC CONSTITUTION 173-177 (2004). Returning to my study, it is worth noting that
even though most of the Hebraic sources are rather formalistic, the Mishnah's formulation is general
enough (and thin enough) to allow for all sorts of functional adjustments. (Josephus failed to allow for
such flexibility, and his formalistic reading of Deuteronomy 17 is not surprisingly very inconsistent
with the political balance of powers that actually existed in first century life, as described supra Part
IVA).
196. PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF
AMERICA 16 (1997).
197. Id., at 27-34, 69-74.
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that it is a two thousand year old conflict.' 98
3) The Evolving Nature of Separation of Powers
Recent scholarship, especially since the 2000 election, has revisited the
contentious issue of the limits and parameters of judicial review.'99 One
particular scholarly controversy concerns the nexus between judicial
independence and judicial review, debating whether the idea of judicial
review follows inevitably from the formation of a truly independent
judiciary.200 This Article demonstrates that the establishment of an
independent judiciary has an indeterminate relationship to the notion of
judicial power over other branches of government. According to
Deuteronomy, the Temple Scroll, and even more Josephus, the executive is
subordinated to an independent judiciary. In contrast, the Mishnah both
promotes the notion of an independent judiciary and protects the political
autonomy of the executive. This would suggest that one can be staunchly
committed to the independence of the judiciary without insisting that it has
any control over other branches. Therefore, granting the judiciary power
over other branches is a distinct legal and political choice that we make.
In addition, this Article provides an interesting perspective on the
almost inevitable tensions generated by the allocation of power. What is
essential to realize is that just as today there are intensive debates about
the parameters of judicial independence, so too similar struggles occurred
in the ancient era. Deuteronomy's constitution represents a dramatic
departure from most of the Bible and ancient Near Eastern literature.
Likewise, the administrative structure advanced by the Mishnah is
jettisoned by the later (and ultimately more influential) Babylonian
Talmudic tradition.
This study highlights the precarious and dynamic nature of separation of
powers. From one vantage point, this should inspire a more resolute
commitment to safeguarding the political preferences of American
constitutionalism, such as judicial independence, judicial review, and the
tripartite division of administrative functions against their perpetual
challengers. Yet from another perspective, this broader survey suggests
198. Id. at 17. Of course, the entire critical legal studies movement has challenged the possibility
of separating law from politics. See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986). Nevertheless, the rabbinic statement of the Mishnah insists that these
realms should ideally be distinguished, and much of American jurisprudence shares this aspiration.
See the perceptive remarks in Kahn, supra note 195, at 43-46.
199. See the sources on judicial independence cited supra note 10; and additionally LAWRENCE
G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 15
(2004); Symposium, Bush v. Gore, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613 (2001); Marbury v. Madison: A
Bicentennial Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003).
200. See Gerber, supra note 5; Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116
YALE L. J. 502 (2006); Mary Sarah Bilder, Why We Have Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 215 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/01/09/bilder.html.
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that the allocation of power is a dynamic process that always needs to be
challenged and modified .21 Rather than viewing our constitutional
choices as inexorable, we should see them as operating within an evolving
framework. We must perpetually inquire whether they should be extended
or reversed, and how they can be adapted to better achieve our collective
political aspirations. A return to the origins of our constitutional values
can help us identify the paths to our preferred destinations.
201. This resonates with the insight of Juan Linz concerning presidential democracy, which has
been so successful in the United States and yet failed to live up to that potential in other political
atmospheres (such as Latin America). See Juan J. Linz, Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy:
Does It Make a Difference?, in 1 THE FAILuRE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3 (Juan J. Linz &
Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994).
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